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1PRIMARY RISKS AND PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE PACIFIC1:
THE PROBLEM OF JAPAN AND THE CHANGING ROLE OF AUSTRALIA
IN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, 1945-1952.
Neville Meaney
Sometimes it is worthwhile to explicate the obvious for it is often found when
this is done that there is more to the matter than meets the eye. And
something of that nature can perhaps be said for this subject.
In the remaking of the international order at the end of World War II
Australia’s overriding concern was Japan and its future position in the Pacific.
Indeed this consideration affected nearly all the major aspects of Australia’s
postwar defence and foreign policy, including what was perhaps the most
important of these, namely its changing relation to Britain and the British
Commonwealth. It is the purpose of this paper to show the nature of this
Japanese process  at work in the changing relationship by examining the
issues of consultation over surrender terms, representation on the bodies
dealing with the occupation, the future of American bases in the Pacific, the
making of the Japanese peace treaty, the coming of the Cold War in Europe
and the creation of the ANZUS pact.2
There is a long history to Japan’s influence on Australia’s relations with
Britain and the British Empire / Commonwealth. From the beginning of the
twentieth century Australia’s character as a nation state had been much
affected by its proximity to an Asia which was seen as alien and a threat to its
survival, and Japan,  above all, was seen to embody this ‘Yellow Peril’. While
Australians’ cultural identity - they defined themselves as belonging to the
white British ‘race’ - pressed them towards seeking close co-operation, even
a kind of integration, with the Mother Country and Empire, nevertheless the
British government’s failure to appreciate their Asian anxieties caused them
to question Britain’s reliability and, as a result, to create a Pacific policy of
their own. This can be seen first at the time of Federation in the movement
2for a White Australia which was intended to preserve the British character of
the country and was aimed most immediately at the Japanese. Since Britain
was at the very time negotiating an alliance with Japan this racial exclusion
policy proved to be an embarrassment and it was only adopted over British
protests. Likewise after the Russo-Japanese war Australia had, in defiance of
all British advice, come to believe that Japan’s dominance of the Western
Pacific presaged not simply a migratory but also a military invasion. Since
Britain preoccupied with the German naval challenge in the North Sea had
withdrawn all its capital ships from the Pacific and had left its East Asian
interests to be cared for by its Japanese ally the Australian authorities who
had no confidence in the alliance introduced compulsory military training,
began to acquire a navy and to look to the United States for succour.
Australia would have preferred, both for sentimental and strategic reasons, to
be protected by a British Empire fleet in the Pacific to which it and the other
Dominions contributed but, given British priorities, this solution to its Japan
problem was not available.3
During World War I, even as Australia enthusiastically supported the British
cause and raised over 350,000 men to fight in Europe, it remained
apprehensive about Japan. Japan’s declaration of war on Germany did
nothing to reassure Australians. Though Japan had entered the war on the
Allies side it made only a very limited contribution to the European theatre.
The Japanese seizure of German territory in China and the North Pacific
combined with their demands on China to accept a client status and their
pressure on Australia to end at least formal discrimination against Japanese
citizens fueled suspicions. Moreover there was a degree of uncertainty about
what Japan might do if the Central Powers gained the upper hand in Europe.
Consequently both those Australians  supporting and those opposing the
introduction of conscription for the Western Front used the argument of the
menace of Japan to bolster their respective cases. In the midst of the war
both naval and military intelligence concentrated their energies on studying
the Japanese danger. The Director of Military Intelligence, with Japan in
mind, concluded that ‘there seems to be a blight over British policy in the East
3- Some British representatives are not in sympathy with our interests,’ and as
a result an Australian ‘Foreign Office’4, the Pacific Branch of the Prime
Minister’s Department, was established.
The prime minister, William Morris Hughes, summed up this war experience,
when he told his British counterpart shortly after the cessation of hostilities
that Australia was ‘profoundly distrustful of Japan’.5 Indeed Hughes was for
this very reason unrelenting in his demand that Australia should have a say in
the peacemaking. During the early years of the war Britain had promised the
Dominions that they would be consulted about the peace and in 1917 it
established the Imperial War Cabinet made up of the leaders of the
Dominions and the Mother Country which was ostensibly to determine
through collective agreeement  the Empire’s defence and foreign policy. In
the event Hughes felt betrayed when the British Prime Minister, ignoring all
previous commitments to the Dominions, negotiated a German armistice with
the other allied leaders and accepted what amounted to general peace terms
based on President Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points. When he learnt of
what had happened Hughes protested vehemently both in public6 and private.
He regarded the failure to consult the Dominions as ‘a breach of the plain
declaration which had been made to them’.7 The Imperial War Cabinet had
become nothing more than a ‘farce and a sham’.8 He urged that at the
subsequent Paris Peace Conference Australia should, along with the other
Dominions, both have a seat on the British Empire’s Delegation and thereby
participate in the deliberations of the Great Powers and also be represented
at plenary meetings in its own right. Hughes was the only Dominion leader to
complain about the lack of consultation over the armistice and though the
Canadian Prime Minister also called for Dominion representation at the Paris
Peace Conference he did so to achieve recognition for national status rather
than to ensure the protection of distinct national interests.
Hughes’ intemperate outburst  so alarmed the British Government that,
fearing for the future of the Empire, they not only acceded to these novel
4demands for representation but also went out of their way to assist Australia
in accomplishing its anti-Japanese aims at the conference. The British
themselves were not opposed to Japan’s desire to include a racial equality
clause in the League of Nations Covenant  and yet, despite the fact that
Australia was the only nation left at the end of the negotiations over the
clause still objecting to it, they deferred to Australia’s wishes and helped to
sink it.9 Japan’s role as a catalyst in bringing about changes in Australia’s
relations with Britain and the Empire at the end of World War I would appear
to be a precursor for the more far reaching changes which were produced out
of World War II. While, however, the parallels between the two seem quite
remarkable, nevertheless there are significant differences in the
circumstances out of which these changes arose and in the ultimate
consequences flowing from them.
Australia’s disappointment at Britain’s behaviour over the 1918 armistice did
not result in disillusionment with the Empire. Australia, like New Zealand, only
grudgingly went along with the new definitions of the British Commonwealth -
embodied in the Balfour Declaration and the Statute of Westminster - which
at the insistence of the Canadians, South Africans and the Irish stressed
national autonomy at the expense of imperial unity. In contrast to the
Canadians, South Africans and Irish, the Pacific Dominions refrained from
appointing their own diplomats and entering into treaties which they had
negotiated for themselves. Following the British Empire’s victory in the First
World War and Japan’s conciliatory attitude in the Pacific, Australia, along
with New Zealand, was during the 1920s happy to co-operate with an
imperial defence policy based on Singapore and a British foreign policy
arrived at after consultation. In both respects, however, Australia conceded
the leading role to Britain. It left it to the British to fund and build the
Singapore naval base and, in general, sat quietly by while Britain handled
international affairs.
In the next decade, however, with the rise of Japanese imperialism in Asia
and German aggression in Europe, Australians became troubled once again
5that the British Commonwealth might be drawn into a war on two fronts and
that the British Government might be compelled to neglect its commitments in
Asia and the Pacific.10 By the end of 1938 the Australian Prime Minister,
Joseph Lyons, was ‘profoundly depressed by the state of the world’ and had
worked himself ‘into a kind of desperate anxiety about the defence of
Australia against Japan’, and his government was ‘tending’ to act upon the
assumption that ‘in the event of war they can expect no help from the UK’.11
Some five months later his successor, R.G. Menzies, in the light of these
developments accepted reluctantly the necessity of Australia breaking further
the unity of the Empire and he announced his government’s intention of
accrediting its own diplomatic representatives to the major countries in the
Pacific. Still putting the issue in British Commonwealth terms he explained
the decision by declaring that since Australia, because of its geographical
position,  had to assume on behalf of the Empire the ‘primary risks and
responsibilites’ in the Pacific it had to have the dominant say in shaping
British Commonwealth policy in the region.12
The Pacific War brought to the surface quite dramatically the inadequacies of
Australia’s previous ideas about dependence on Britain and the British
Commonwealth. Japan’s rapid conquest of Southeast Asia which carried with
it the prospect of imminent invasion stirred the nation to the quick. What
Menzies had adumbrated the Labor governments which held office during
and after the Pacific War adopted fully, and they redesigned Australia’s
relationship with Britain and the British Commonwealth in the light of the war
experience. In constructing their postwar defence and foreign policy they,
however, did not reject the special ties to Britain and the Commonwealth but
rather sought to fashion them anew to ensure that consultation was effective
and that Australia should assume the leading role for the Commonwealth  in
the Pacific. The hard lesson that the war had taught was that Britain if left to
act for the Commonwealth would, naturally enough, when pressed
subordinate Australia’s interests to its own. As Dr H.V. Evatt, the Minister for
External Affairs, put it in a letter to Curtin at the time of the 1944 British
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, ‘Where the primary
6responsibility is with a Dominion and not with the United Kingdom, the
Dominion concerned should be as fully assured of proper support from the
United Kingdom as the United Kingdom is of Dominion support in its own
relations in Europe and special spheres such as the Near and Middle East’.13
Thus, driven by a fear of a Japanese military resurgence, the Australian
Government in dealing with post-war Japan and all the issues associated with
the occupation and the peace strove to apply this revised conception of the
British Commonwealth.
Consultation and Representation
By the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945 the Australian
government, especially through the advocacy of Evatt, had adopted the
essence of this new approach to Britain and the Commonwealth. Evatt, like
the government and their advisers, was acutely conscious that the Singapore
base policy had failed the country, that Britain had not been able to send a
fleet to meet the Japanese onslaught, that Britain in conjunction with America
had agreed on a Europe-first strategy regardless of its possible
consequences for Australia and that Britain with America and China at the
Cairo Conference in November 1943 had without a word to Australia decided
peace terms for the Pacific. From this time Evatt, whose own political
ambitions were merged with those of Australia the nation state, set out on a
course, a course supported by his ministerial colleagues, aimed at bringing
the British to heel and making them accept the Australasian Dominions’ right
to priority in Pacific policy.
To express Australian sense of outrage Evatt met unilateralism with
unilateralism. In January 1944 without either consulting or informing the
British he organised a conference with New Zealand in Canberra at which the
two Dominions laid down their principles for the peacemaking. Though the
British High Commissioner had sounded the Australian Prime Minister and
the Department of External Affairs about the conference he was unable
beforehand to discover its true purpose.14 The ANZAC pact, a bi-lateral
Commonwealth agreement which excluded the British,  though it was
7intended primarily as a rebuke to the Americans, nevertheless also had a
message for the British, a message which was to be repeated again and
again in the years following the end of hostilities. Under the ANZAC pact the
two governments claimed a right to be ‘represented at the highest level’ on all
bodies set up to decide the terms of the armistices and also to take part in
the making of the peace, including the planning of a world organisation  for
collective security. Moreover, illustrating their main concern about the post-
war world, they agreed that a regional zone of defence stretching from the
‘the arc of islands North and Northeast of Australia, to Western Samoa and
the Cook Islands’ should be established and they looked forward to working
with Britain in taking prime responsibility for policing this zone.15
And they had some success or rather seeming success. During  the British
Commonwealth meeting of ministers in April 1945, prior to the San Francisco
Conference which was to establish the United Nations Organisation, Evatt
reported to Curtin that the British Government had promised to do their
utmost ‘to support the Australian and New Zealand claim to participate as
principals in the armistice arrangements with Japan’.16 This Australian
agitation was not so much motivated by a desire to stress its autonomy as by
a determination to safeguard the interests of the British Commonwealth in the
Pacific. Australia considered itself the guardian of British civilisation in the
Pacific. As Curtin had explained at the 1944 Prime Ministers’ Conference,
Australia, in contemplating the post-war world, had reservations about the
efficacy of a new League of Nations and wanted to cultivate closer bonds,
especially in defence, with Britain and the British Commonwealth as a basis
for national security. 17
The Australian leaders were then duly shocked when at the Potsdam
Conference on 26 July the Americans, the British and the Chinese, without
any prior notice, publicly announced the capitulation terms which they had
offered to Japan. Once more the Australians had learnt of the Great Powers’
decision through the press. As a result the Australians rejected a British
8invitation to send a service representative to be ‘attached’ to their delegation
at the surrender ceremony - symbolically making the Australian role a
function of that of the British - and instead organised through the Americans
to be represented in their own right. Bypassing the British the Australian
Government informed the United States that Australia should sign the
surrender document in its own right. Furthermore, they offered to provide an
occupation force of their own which would be ‘subordinate only to the
Supreme Command’. And finally they demanded that Australia be accepted
as a full member of the Council of Foreign Ministers on ‘all matters affecting
or concerning the Pacific and Far east’. 18
For the Australians this was a replay of 1918 and, like Hughes, they were
greatly incensed. They protested to the new Labour Government in London.
Evatt in a message to the Dominions Secretary on 9 August asserted that the
British explanation for their behaviour - which pleaded time and circumstance
- was unacceptable. Prime Minister David Lloyd George at the end of World
War I had given more ‘effective recognition of the Dominions’ in the
peacemaking. The British showed an ‘indifference ... to what should now be
the fully recognised status and position of Australia and other
Dominions....Full consultation on an equal footing is the only basis of
complete confidence and co-operation.... our desire is to work in the closest
harmony with you but the events of 1942 in the Pacific have produced a deep
impression in this Country and it is quite impossible to expect Australia to
have these matters [the armistice and peace terms] cleared through London
instead of having a right to participate as a principal in the planning of the
Peace Settlement’. 19
The Prime Minister, J.B. Chifley, the Defence Minister, J.A. Beasley, as well
as Evatt made public statements reproving the British. Evatt, a great admirer
of Billy Hughes, was the most outspoken. In a press statement he
complained that on the British part there was ‘Still a deplorable tendency ...to
relegate Australia to subordinate status and either not consult it at all or to
9consult it in a perfunctory way and not on a footing of equality.’ And he flung
in their face the accumulated grievances, from learning of the Potsdam terms
for  a Japanese armistice from the press to being excluded from the Council
of Foreign Ministers and being asked to accept a subordinate place in the
formal act of surrender. To add insult to injury he sent a personal note to the
British Dominions Secretary referring him to his message of 9 August, ‘to
which I received no reply’, and pointing out that his own public comments
‘followed upon your own public statement yesterday.’ Australia was not to be
ignored. The coming to office of a Labour Government in Britain raised the
Australians’ expectations of better treatment - apart from party considerations
the new Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, had been Dominions Secretary in the
Coalition War Government - but it did not, however, moderate the language
they used in arguing their case. 20
The British resented the accusatory tone of the Australian outbursts and this
led to a rather testy exchange between the prime ministers. Though the
Dominions Office had to admit the substance of the Australian charges,
namely that ‘in the matter of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam
Ultimatum we failed to live up to our principles of inter-imperial consultation
and information on major issues of foreign policy,’ nevertheless they would
not suffer quietly this public chastisement.The British authorities thought Evatt
‘impertinent’, using a word which indicated an offence given by an inferior to a
superior. They were ‘much disturbed’ by the Australian criticisms. After taking
counsel with Addison and Bevin, Attlee wrote to Chifley. He pleaded that,
despite their earnest desire that Australia should be ‘fully consulted in all
matters relating to the Pacific Settlement and ...participate fully as a principal
in International bodies set up to discuss these matters’, the ‘strains and
stresses of war’ had prevented them from consulting Australia ‘in advance as
completely as we should have wished.’ He contested Evatt’s account of
Britain’s attitude to Australia’s independent representation at the Japanese
surrender but said that ‘in the interest of good relations’ the British
government would refrain from entering into a public controversy, and he
hoped that in the future the Australians would exercise the same restraint.
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Chifley was in no way abashed or appeased by Attlee’s words. He replied
‘with equal frankness’ that the statements of Evatt, Beasley and himself
represented the views of the Australian Government which considered it ‘vital’
that Australia be accepted as a party principal to the peace settlements,
especially on ‘all aspects affecting the Pacific and the Far East.’ He was
pleased that the British Government had agreed to support Australia’s claims
for membership of the Council of Foreign Ministers which had been
established at Potsdam to draft the terms of the peace, and he announced
that he was sending Evatt to London to join in the negotiations. Chifley
expressed the wish that the British secure for Evatt ‘a voice in the Council’s
deliberations’ and invite him to take part in their Cabinet meetings when
questions affecting the peace settlement were under discussion.21
In this mood the Australians did not look kindly upon a British invitation to
contribute to a British Commonwealth Force for the occupation of Japan.
Rather, in line with the position they had already taken with the Americans,
they insisted that Australia should have an identity of its own in the
occupation and that its forces should be responsible directly to the American
General Douglas MacArthur who was Supreme Commander Allied Powers in
Japan (SCAP). Even when the British offered to allow an Australian to have
command of the force they still at first refused to join in a Commonwealth
contingent. Once in England Evatt, however, came to see merit in the revised
proposal and he urged Chifley to reconsider. Since Australia would appoint
the commander and have executive authority over the Commonwealth force,
concessions which the British were willing to make,  then by assuming this
role Australia would demonstrate its ‘leadership in Pacific affairs and Pacific
settlement.’ The Australian Government were won over. They reversed
themselves and accepted participation on these terms. The Australians
contributed the largest number of servicemen to the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force (BCOF), which, in addition to the Australians, included
British, New Zealand and Indian detachments.The original rejection had not
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been on narrow nationalist grounds. Chifley in July had been willing to
contribute troops to a joint British Commonwealth force which was being
planned for the invasion of Japan. Furthermore in explaining Australia’s
refusal to be part of a British-led occupation force he reaffirmed John Curtin’s
wish to ‘further the cause of British Commonwealth in the Pacific’.22 The
assertion of separateness was a response to the British failure to honour their
pledge that Australia would have a voice in the armistice and surrender. It
was a means of underscoring the Australians conviction that they should
assume the leadership of the British Commonwealth in the Pacific region.
This was the first major Commonwealth military undertaking which was
commanded by a Dominion officer. For the purpose a new command
structure was instituted. The Australian commander was responsible to the
participating Commonwealth governments through their Joint Chiefs of Staff
in Melbourne. The JCOSA comprised the Australian Chiefs of Staff of the
three services together with representatives of the British and New Zealand
Chiefs of Staff and the Commander-in-chief of the Indian military forces. This
rather cumbersome body did not last. Between 1947 and 1949, as the
Indians and then the British and the New Zealanders withdrew their
contingents - the hard-pressed British gave a greater importance to Europe
and the Middle East - the Australians with the consent of Britain and New
Zealand took the opportunity to assume direct control of the rump BCOF. In
1948 the JCOSA was abolished and the Australian Chiefs of Staff took over
the responsibility for the force. To maintain the appearance of a British
Commonwealth occupation force a British and New Zealand service
representative was attached to the Australian Chiefs of Staff.23 This first
experiment in a Dominion-led joint Commonwealth operation was not
particularly successful. The different strategic priorities and interests as well
as some friction between the various components tended to undermine the
original desire to express through the BCOF a common international identity.
Australian efforts to make the Commonwealth serve its Pacific purposes
failed at its first attempt.
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The next most significant consultation and representation question was how
the policy for the occupation was to be determined. The Australians’ aim was
to achieve membership of all advisory bodies established for this purpose, to
have a say in defining their function and to prevent the United States from
having a veto power in their proceedings which, if permitted, would enable it
to act unilaterally in managing postwar Japan. On 29 August the United
States Government had sent to General MacArthur their ‘Initial Post-
Surrender Policy for Japan’ which laid down objectives and guidelines for the
treatment of the defeated country. In this the Americans had stated that they
would make every effort by consultation through advisory bodies to establish
policies for the conduct of the occupation which would ‘satisfy the principal
allied powers’, but if the allied powers failed to agree then ‘the policies of the
United States will govern’.24
Evatt’s first task in pursuing these goals in London was to gain access to the
Council of Foreign Ministers which had before it the issue of how the policies
for occupied Japan were to be decided. With the assistance of the British,
who were now anxious to repair Commonwealth relations, Evatt was drawn
into these discussions. The Americans were anxious that there should not be
a control council in Japan similar to the one set up for the administration of
occupied Germany on which the four great allied powers had a right of veto.
Instead they wanted the establishment of a Far East Advisory Committee
(FEAC) in Washington, and they had urged Britain to back their plan ‘if only to
forestall Soviet pressure for a four Power Control Council in Japan which
would be embarrassing’ to them. The British agreed and Evatt too went along
on the understanding that all the countries who had been active belligerents
in the Pacific War should be members of the Commission and that the
question of a Control Council in Tokyo should be postponed until after the
Commission had met.25 Evatt had a preference for a control council on the
spot which could exercise direct supervision over the occupation.26
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On this basis the eleven member Commission duly convened in October and
set about defining the objectives and principles which should govern the
occupation. Evatt was made chairman of the Commission’s Basic Policies
and Objectives Committee. Because of differences between the Great
Powers the Commission had not been given terms of reference and Evatt
hoped that his committee would itself define the Commission’s powers and
functions. Taking the American Post-Surrender Policy as his guide he set
about devising a document which laid down the ends to be sought in the
occupation. He was opposed to giving the Americans a right of veto on
matters of policy. The most he would concede in this direction was a vague,
undefined ‘reserve authority’ for SCAP. He was intent on trying to ensure that
Australia would have an equal voice in the running of the occupation. The
FEAC, in general, seemed well disposed to the committee’s report and at the
beginning of December the Commission members approved the report for
reference to their respective governments.27
Yet by this time the  Great Powers had made the Commission’s work
irrelevant. The Soviet Union which wanted a control council for Japan along
the lines of that established in Germany with a right of veto had refused to
take its seat on the FEAC, and the Americans, desirous of having Soviet
Union co-operation in the post-war settlement, had begun to reconsider the
whole scheme of policy-making for postwar Japan. At the end of October they
were contemplating setting up alongside the FEAC a four power council in
Tokyo which would be ‘consulting’ and ‘advisory’ to SCAP. Evatt, alerted to
this through the press, even as he was working on the FEAC policy and
objectives, asked the United States Secretary of State, James Byrnes, not to
agree to such a council unless Australia was a member of it. He insisted that
Australia should be accepted as the representative of the British
Commonwealth on Pacific matters and properly pointed out that Australia’s
contribution to the Pacific war far exceeded that of the Soviet Union.28
Australia’s interposition, like the FEAC itself, was ignored. In December at the
Moscow conference of the American, British and Russian Foreign Ministers a
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deal was done and the  lesser belligerents were presented with a fait
accompli, a compromise arrangement about which they had had no say.
In Australian eyes  this was a further act of British perfidy. Evatt was again
highly indignant. The British though they had known about the American
proposal from 26 November did not inform the Dominions about it until 7
December, that is on the eve of a public announcement of the Great Powers’
Foreign Ministers’ conference. The conference was to consider the ‘Terms of
reference of the Allied Commission for Japan and the Far Eastern
Commission’. Since these matters ‘obviously affect directly the Pacific and
Japanese settlement’ Evatt maintained that Australia had a right to participate
in its deliberations. Cabling home from Washington Evatt took the view that
on Far East and Pacific affairs ‘there should be no decisions or even
international discussions on such matters unless Australia fully participates in
such discussions.’ Indeed, it was his view, in accordance with his established
position, that Britain should be asked to press for Australian representation at
the conference or, failing that, that Britain should not consent to any decision
on any topic that concerned Australia.29
Despite Australian wishes the three Great Powers, without any reference
back to the other interested parties, agreed at Moscow on the membership
and functions of both a Far East Commission (FEC) located in Washington,
which would replace the FEAC, and an Allied Council which was to sit in
Tokyo. As a result of horse-trading between the Americans and the Russians
a complex compromise was reached. While the FEC, made up of all the
nations that had taken an active part in the Pacific War, was ‘to formulate
policies, principles and standards’ for occupied Japan, no decision would be
binding unless all four Great Power members (the three Moscow Conference
powers plus China) voted for it. In the absence of an FEC policy  the
Americans were, however, permitted to issue ‘interim directives’ to SCAP
which, in effect,  meant that the United States by vetoing any FEC measure
of which they did not approve would still be able to keep control of policy-
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making. In return for Russian co-operation over the FEC, the United States
accepted a four member Great Power Council in Japan. The Americans had
insisted that the word ‘control’ should be omitted from its title and that it have
only a consultative and advisory role. Bevin had consented to this because
he said that it was impossible to persuade the Russians and the Americans
either to give up their veto on the FEC or to admit Australia as an additional
member of the Allied Council. He did not want to jeopardise a chance of
securing Russian co-operation in the Far East settlement. To appease the
Australians the British Cabinet, because of ‘Australia’s interest in the area’,
invited Canberra to nominate an Australian to represent Britain and the British
Commonwealth on the Allied Council.30
The Australians were very vexed with what had been done, with the fact that
the Great Powers had ignored the work of the FEAC, arbitrarily dictated a
structure for the management of the occupation and given themselves a veto
right on the FEC, and in response to the American invitation to join the FEC
on the terms set down by the Moscow Conference, they voiced their
displeasure. Since they were ‘strongly opposed’ to the veto power they
informed the Americans that they were going to give the matter ‘further
consideration’, hinting thereby that they might be unwilling to accept
membership on these terms. Two weeks later Evatt expanded on their
objections. Further consideration had deepened their apprehension about the
injustice and unreasonablenes of the veto power. The FEAC after full
consultation with all its members had arrived at a statement of basic policy.
The Australian Government was ‘anxious to be assured that full consideration
will be given to the decisions already made’ by the FEAC. They believed that
all nations who were to be members of the FEC should have ‘an opportunity
to discuss the terms of reference including the veto power at the next meeting
of the Commission.’ Australia resented the fact that the Great Power veto
made Australia’s status ‘in some ways inferior’. As a result of ‘its sustained
and decisive contribution to victory against Japan’ it was entitled to be
‘regarded as a party principal in all Pacific affairs.’ Australia considered that
its future relationship with the United States should be based ‘on the principle
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of full and active partnership’ and that the existence of the veto was ‘quite
inconsistent with such a relationship’.31 Australia, despite these reservations,
had no choice in the matter and had to accept membership of the FEC on the
conditions laid down at the Moscow meeting.
The Australians did not object to the limited functions of the Allied Council.
Perhaps since the Australians were representing the British Commonwealth
on the Council and thus were raised, at least symbolically, to the dignity of a
great power they were willing to accept what the Moscow Conference had
decreed. Though initially the British had proposed that the Australians should
choose their nominee after consultation with London, Wellington and New
Delhi, they in the event did not take soundings in the other capitals before
selecting Professor Macmahon Ball, a Melbourne University political scientist,
for the post. This Australian action caused some fluttering in the dovecotes of
Whitehall. The Foreign Office thought Macmahon a quite unsuitable
appointment.  They had reservations of a personal nature about the man.
While Australian Political Liaison Officer with the Allied Command in the
Dutch East Indies he had had some acerbic exchanges with his British
counterpart, Esler Dening, whom the British were thinking of sending to
Tokyo as their political representative to SCAP. They objected to Ball even
more on the grounds that he was not ‘a really first-class man of influence and
wide experience of international affairs and of negotiation’ who could ‘regard
himself as equally representing the United Kingdom, New Zealand and India.’
Their preference was for Keith Officer who, besides  holding a number of
senior diplomatic posts, had been the Australian Liaison Officer in the
Cabinet Office in London. When informal inquiries indicated that Evatt was
not disposed to change his mind, Bevin and Addison took the matter to
Attlee. Addison told Attlee that since this was ‘a joint appointment...we are
entitled to insist on our interest being represented by someone in whom we
have confidence.’ Yet though the Prime Minister appealed directly to Chifley
the Australians would not budge and the British felt obliged to defer to
Canberra’s wishes.32
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The British never reconciled themselves to Ball’s appointment and throughout
the whole period in which he filled the post they bombarded the Australian
Government with criticisms of his performance, hoping to secure his recall.
Ball saw his role as primarily representing Australian interests. He strove to
ensure that Japan was disarmed and democratised so that it could not  again
menace Australia, and in the process he occasionally dared to question
SCAP’s dictatorial regime and to challenge MacArthur’s contemptuous
treatment of the Allied Council. He even proposed to act as a mediator, doing
‘whatever possible to reconcile American and Russian points of view.’ For the
British, who were anxious to obtain American support against the Soviets in
Western Europe and the Middle East, Ball’s inclination to challenge
MacArthur’s authority was most troublesome. The Australian government
itself was not happy that Ball should cause problems with the Americans.
Chifley on his way home from London, during a brief stay in Tokyo in May
1946, told Ball that ‘in view of our association with MacArthur and his
friendliness to us, we should not give the impression that we are “ganging up”
with his enemies in America or with the Russians.’ Likewise Evatt assured the
British that the Australian government did not wish Ball to be a mediator but
rather to do all he could ‘to support MacArthur who has responsibility for
execution of policy in Japan.’33 Yet, though the Australian government
seemed to sympathise with the British, they did little to curb Ball and make
him toe MacArthur’s line. As a result British doubts were never set to rest.
Evatt had proudly proclaimed in his foreign affairs statement to parliament in
March 1946 that ‘The appointment of an Australian on Australian nomination
to represent not only Australia but also other Governments of the British
Commonwealth, including the United Kingdom itself, is a development of
great importance....an entirely new concept of British Commonwealth
relations is now emerging. This concept tends to reconcile full Dominion
autonomy with full British co-operation.... This is evidence that machinery of
co-operation has now reached a stage where a common policy can be
carried through a chosen Dominion instrumentality in an area or in relation to
a subject matter which is of primary concern to that Dominion’.34 This episode
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was not, however, an auspicious beginning for the new experiment in British
Commonwealth relations.
Joint bases with the Americans and a Defence Arrangement for the
Pacific.
The Pacific War had brought home to the Australians the inadequacies of a
London-centred Imperial defence and foreign policy and caused them to seek
a more comprehensive and dependable security arrangement and one in
which they would have a major say. The Singapore strategy had failed them.
A British Fleet had not been sent to head off the downward thrust of the
Japanese.The British base itself had proved to be indefensible. It was on the
periphery of the direct line of attack against Australia and was not backed up
by a friendly hinterland which could provide assured supply lines and
logistical support. Recognising this Evatt had declared as early as 1943 that
Australia at the end of the war would seek to acquire ‘a screen of bases’
under its own or joint control in the island chains to the north and northwest of
the continent. These bases were to be located in the Dutch East Indies,
Portuguese Timor, French New Caledonia as well as in Australian mandated
territory and the British Solomon islands. All the European Empires had
collapsed before the might of the Japanese army and navy. It was imperative
that Australia should have a reliable forward defence which would sit athwart
the Japanese path to the South Pacific.35 Australia and New Zealand in the
ANZAC Agreement committed themselves to establishing ‘a regional zone of
defence comprising the South West and South Pacific’ which was to be
based on Australia and New Zealand and stretch through ‘the arc of islands
North and Northeast of Australia, to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.’
In explaining their objective to the British, the Australians, taking their cue
from the American-British-Russian Moscow Declaration of December 1943 in
which it was suggested that individual United Nations would in the postwar
era assume responsibility for policing specific areas of the globe, asserted
their right to take responsibility for policing Portuguese Timor, Australian New
Guinea and the Solomon Islands and to share the policing of the Netherland
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East Indies  and the New Hebrides. And they looked forward to completing
their regional zone of defence through an agreement reached with the
governments which had territories in the region, namely Britain, United
States, Netherlands, France and Portugal.36 Indeed Evatt was determined not
to let Australian security rest simply on global collective security under the
United Nations and had backed the inclusion of Article 52 in the UN Charter
which provided for ‘regional defence arrangements’. The Australians were
unwilling to leave the initiative on the Southwest and South Pacific to the
Great Powers which had shown an almost total indifference to the Pacific
Dominions’ concerns.
Though the Australasians were unable to persuade Britain and the United
States to enter into negotiations over a defence agreement they did not
abandon the plan, and consequently when the Americans at the end of the
Pacific War claimed permanent rights in the bases which they had built on
British Comonwealth territories, the Australians tried to link discussions over
the joint use of the South Pacific bases to this scheme for a broad defence
arrangement and to commit the British to supporting such a strategy. As they
put it to the British, since the security of the Commonwealth in the Pacific
depended on an agreement with America, London should  join in a common
front with the Pacific Dominions to achieve this goal. And on this issue the
British seemed willing to let Australia call the shots. Evatt made it plain in his
talks with the American Secretary of State, James Byrnes, that ‘leadership by
your country is the basis of the Pacific settlement and within that leadership
we think that the real partnership [is] with countries like Australia and New
Zealand and applied(sic) responsibility by the weaker partners’.37
American Secretary of State James Byrnes had suggested to Bevin during
the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September that the
British assist the United States to retain the use of many of the bases which
they had built and used during the war, and on 7 November  he presented
the British with a comprehensive list of such bases in British Commonwealth
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territories. Eight of these were in the South Pacific; Britain had administration
rights in six, New Zealand in one, Upolu which was in its mandated territory of
Western Samoa and Australia one, Manus in the Admiralty islands which was
part of its New Guinea League of Nations mandate. Manus was by far the
most important of these bases. The island harbour was very large and had
natural protection. The Americans had spent, according to their estimates,
almost $150,000,000 on naval and air force installations and fortifications,
which was more than they had spent altogether on all the others.38 On 22
November Addison informed Chifley of these American overtures and warned
him that the Americans were intending to approach Australia and New
Zealand on the same matter. A few weeks later he sent Canberra Britain’s
preliminary thoughts about the proposal. The British saw that it was ‘clearly to
our advantage’ to use the opportunity ‘to associate the United States to the
maximum extent in the defence of British Commonwealth territory’ and to
secure reciprocal rights to joint use of American bases. The government,
troubled that any premature action might ‘prejudice’ the establishment of the
United Nations, however, deemed it prudent to do nothing until after the
formation of the Security Council. They urged that the British Commonwealth
countries should keep in step in dealing with the American proposal.39
The Australians’ response was at one with the position they had staked out
for themselves in the ANZAC Agreement. Evatt, who had been alerted to the
American ambitions while in the United States in November, had declared in
an address to the National Press Club in Washington that Australia would be
willing to grant America the use of Manus base in return for America
assuming responsibility for Australian security.40 The Australian Government
also held that there were ‘long term advantages in having strong joint British
Commonwealth - United States bases in the Pacific’ but emphasised that
‘such bases must be related to an overall plan in which their role should be
clearly defined.’ They had been aware since 1943 of American claims to keep
Manus at the end of the war. Indeed in the ANZAC Agreement they had
addressed just this issue when they stated that it was ‘a recognised principle
of international practice that the construction and use in time of war of
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military, naval or air installations in any territory under the sovereignty or
control of another power, does not, in itself, afford any basis for territorial
claims or rights of sovereignty or control after the conclusion of hostilities.’
Thus they told the British that they were opposed to the handing over of
either sovereignty or control of any British Commonwealth territory to the
Americans and expected that Britain would refuse to hold any conversations
with the United States about the Pacific unless they and the New Zealanders
were ‘represented at all stages of the the talks’.41
Having been warned of the Pacific Dominions’ strong feelings, Bevin and
Addison called a meeting of the Dominions’ representatives with Byrnes in
London on 22 January 1946, and it was decided to form a joint commission to
be made up of military and political representatives of Britain, Australia, New
Zealand and America to discuss the United States proposal to acquire base
rights in Pacific islands under British Commonwealth control.42 The British
Government would seem to have accepted the Australian demand that
nothing should be done without the active participation of the Pacific
Dominions and that the British Commonwealth should reach a common
standpoint on the American proposals. When informed of what had been
agreed in London the Australian Government found the terms of reference for
the Joint Commission to be inadequate. They reaffirmed their established
policy and recommended that the Commission’s task should be ‘To examine
and report upon i) Future defence arrangements in the Pacific Zone affecting
the joint interests of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and
new Zealand; ii) The future status and use of Pacific Bases, including those
established or used during the war by any of the... four nations.’ Australia
also intimated that it would prefer the Commission to meet in Australia rather
than the United States.43 Evatt believed that Japan was ‘still a menace,’ and
he cabled the Australian representatives in London that ‘We would never be
forgiven if arrangements for Pacific bases were made except in conjunction
with the overall arrangements for mutual defence’.44
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The Australian wish to broaden the scope of the talks posed great difficulties
for the British. The base talks were of great importance to them. In the first
place they wanted to maintain the close wartime collaboration in global
defence policy with the United States, and in the second they were
concerned to avoid anything likely to harm the prospects of the British loan
which was having a hard passage through Congress at the time. To meet the
problem Attlee summoned a British Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting
for April, ‘the particular subject which I have in mind as one on which we
should take Counsel together ...[being] that of the situation in the Pacific’.45 In
the meanwhile the British and the New Zealanders, knowing that the
Americans would reject any attempt to widen the Commission’s terms of
reference, tried to persuade the Australians not to boycott its discussions.
The British accepted that the base question could ‘only be fully considered
and finally settled as part of a general picture, namely, future arrangements in
the Pacific’. Since, however, it seemed that any such agreement would
require Security Council approval, talks aimed at this end were premature
and even perhaps counterproductive. Moreover it was  pointed out that the
talks were to be merely ‘informal and exploratory’: they would not commit the
parties. Thus it would be an unnecessary affront to the Americans to refuse to
take part in the Joint Commission. But nothing could shake the Australians’
resolve. The Australian Government was mindful of how in the recent war the
British, Dutch and American bases had fallen before the Japanese southward
advance. They needed ‘to provide for the safety of the country’ and therefore
remained adamant that they would not join in the talks unless they covered
Pacific security.46 They requested the British not to enter into any discussions
with the Americans until after the British Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Conference had had an opportunity to consider the matter and arrive at ‘a
common British Commonwealth course’.47
Despite Australian objections the British and New Zealanders took part in the
Washington meeting. At the end of these discussions the Dominions Office
informed the Australians of what they had learnt of the Americans’ position.
The United States wanted to conduct bi-lateral negotiations with each of the
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British Commonwealth countries. The Americans dismissed British arguments
that any deals over air and naval bases made before the establishment of the
Security Council and without its blessing would undermine the United Nations
Organisation. They claimed that the Russians would not wait for provocations
and would take their own security measures as and when they thought fit.
The American officials had also ‘begged’ the British not to raise the
reciprocity issue, saying that it did  not ‘strictly arise in view of the fact that we
established no wartime bases in American-controlled territory and they seem
to wish us to be content with the belief that we should get these rights if an
emergency actually arose’.48
The Americans were not behindhand in opening negotiations with the
Australians; they had given more attention to Manus than to any other island.
In their Memorandum of 14 March they provided two draft agreements
covering the proposed conditions for American joint use of the bases and an
outline of a United Nations trusteeship for the Admiralty Islands which would
permit the Americans to use the naval and air stations in the islands. Under
the proposed agreement Australia would have responsibility for the cost of
maintaining the bases and the Americans reserved the right at their discretion
to take full control of them.49 On 8 April the Australian Cabinet adopted a
memorandum by the Prime Minister which embodied the principles to govern
the Australian reply. They agreed that it would be ‘to our advantage to
associate the United States in the maintenance of security in the Southwest
Pacific’ and approved American use of Manus as part of a wider reciprocal
defence arrangement. Evatt argued in the debate that any attempt to include
Holland or France in the arrangement, as had been suggested in the ANZAC
Pact, should be avoided. It ‘would raise more directly the question of Russian
participation’ and thus be an embarrassment to the Americans. His solution
was that Australia should just seek a tripartite alliance with New Zealand and
the United States.50 The American Charge d’Affaires in Canberra, John R.
Minter, reported to the State Department that Evatt wanted a tripartite
defence arrangement similar to that which Canada had with the United
States. He told Washington that this was ‘Evatt’s pet plan for keeping United
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States and Australia in closest association’. It seemed as though the
Australians, in order to achieve their security agreement with the United
States, might well be willing to exclude Britain from the arrangement.51 The
Commonwealth analogy they had in mind was Canada’s bi-lateral
relationship with the United States.
Yet, even as the Australians were contemplating a separate deal with the
Americans, the British, heeding Australia’s earlier appeals, were becoming
ever more  committed to the idea that the Commonwealth should approach
the Americans with a united front. Bevin cautioned the British Ambassador in
Washington against proceeding any further with the Americans. It was, he
said, ‘of cardinal importance that the British Commonwealth countries
concerned should act in full consultation and agreement with one another
during the actual period of negotiation.’ After the Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Conference they would ‘be able to take a definite line’.52 By the time
of the Conference the British Government, with the concurrence of the Chiefs
of Staff, had decided to support the original Australian proposal for a four
power meeting and their proposal for a regional defence arrangement. For
the British then the Prime Ministers’ Conference was a critical occasion in the
evolution of the Commonwealth in the Pacific.
At the opening meeting on 20 April Chifley set out very clearly the rationale
for Australia’s approach to Pacific defence.  He remarked that
Australia had been in a very difficult position in 1942-43.They had
recognised then that the British Commonwealth must use the greater
part of its resources to preserve the United Kingdom...and that in those
circumstances they could not expect that much material assistance
could be given towards the defence of Australia and New Zealand. They
wished, however, to do their best to ensure that such a situation should
not arise again in the future. It was possible that Japan might again
become capable of aggression in the Pacific; and the security of
Australia and New Zealand might be threatened from other quarters.
They were anxious, therefore, that properly co-ordinated arrangements
should be made in advance so that the future security of Australia and
New Zealand should be assured.
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Again on 23 April when the question of the United States bases was
discussed Chifley, in introducing his Memorandum of 8 April, repeated the
same lesson to be learnt from the Pacific War, and declared that in the future
Australia and New Zealand ‘must themselves make a larger contribution
towards the defence of the British Commonwealth’ and that this could best be
done in the Pacific. Ignoring Evatt’s preferred tripartite plan he hoped that ‘it
would be possible to devise a common scheme of defence for this area after
discussion, in the first instance, between the Governments of the United
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, and thereafter with the United States
Government’. In accordance with the prescriptions of the Memorandum,
which had looked to a defence in depth centred on three lines of bases -
‘Advanced’, ‘Intermediate’ and ‘Rear’ -  from the southernmost tip of the
Japanese main islands to the immediate north and northwest of the
Australian coast, Chifley added that ‘at a later stage’ it might be possible to
bring France, Portugal and the Netherlands into the scheme. In this respect
Chifley
stressed the importance of securing facilities for British Commonwealth
bases in the Netherland East Indies... ‘If an independent Indonesian
republic were created, it would become even more important that we
should secure appropriate military facilities in such places as Batavia,
Sourabaya and Koepang. This was in the outer ring of any defence
scheme for the South-West Pacific and was almost as important for that
purpose as New Guinea’.
This was an up-dated version of the original ANZAC pact plan. Furthermore,
if such a scheme were adopted, he believed that it should be controlled
through the defence organisation in Australia. From this he concluded that
joint use of bases should only be conceded to the United States in return for
its acceptance of defence obligations in this security arrangement. American
claims to sovereignty or exclusive rights in British Commonwealth territory
should be resisted. Evatt added that they also sought reciprocal base rights
so that all the countries involved in the defence scheme would be able ‘in
case of need to use each other’s bases’.53 Though they did not explicitly
make the point nevertheless it would appear that the Australians, having
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experienced the isolationism and unilateralism of the Americans, were
determined to bind the United States to Australia in so complete a way that a
threat to Australia perforce became a threat to America. And indeed even as
Evatt was insisting on British Commonwealth solidarity in dealing with the
Americans he was repeating to the American Charge d’Affaires in London
what he had told Minter in Canberra, namely  his preference for a tripartite
scheme based on the model of the Canada-United States Joint Defence
Board. In explanation he pointed out that Australia and New Zealand
represented the Commonwealth in the Pacific, ‘as Australia is now doing in
Japan’.54
Shortly before the first meeting of the Prime Ministers’ Conference, Byrnes
had requested Bevin to hasten the process of negotiation on the Pacific
bases; he more than hinted that it would be a great help to the Truman
Administration in persuading Congress to pass the British Loan bill. Thus the
British Government was under some pressure to resolve the matter. But they
were caught between two stools. On the one hand they wanted to placate the
Americans while on the other they wished to keep the unity of the
Commonwealth, especially for defence purposes. Following the first two
meetings with the Australians and New Zealanders the British proposed to
the Conference that Byrnes be invited to meet with the Commonwealth
leaders for a wide-ranging discussion of the bases problem. For the
Australians, however, this was not good enough. They counter-proposed that
Byrnes should be given a clear statement indicating that the three
Commonwealth countries favoured a regional security arrangement for the
South Pacific and Southwest Pacific and that the question of base use should
be discussed in that framework. Though both the British and New Zealand
leaders agreed with the Australian objective they doubted whether it would be
‘good tactics’ to present the Americans with such a plan since, apart from
other considerations, they would for domestic political reasons have great
difficulty in accepting the idea of a general defence scheme.The Australians
stood their ground, and the British and New Zealanders, in the interests of
maintaining Commonwealth unity, gave way.  Bevin was instructed to put  the
27
Australian conditions to Byrnes as representing the view of all three
Commonwealth countries.55 The British accepted that the Australians,
because they bore the prime risks, had the prime responsibility for the British
Commonwealth in the Pacific.
Byrnes rejected these terms out of hand. He told Bevin that it would be ‘quite
impossible’ to involve the United States in any form of regional defence
arrangement in the Southwest Pacific. American defence authorities ‘no
longer see any likelihood of Japan coming back as the future enemy.’ His
interest in the Pacific bases was driven by the need to appease Congress
and make it more amenable to approving the British loan. The United States
was not keenly concerned about Manus Island nor did they wish to keep
forces there. The United States navy only wanted to use the base for minor
repairs. He concluded on this point that if the Commonwealth countries could
not meet American wishes for the use of the bases ‘the matter would have to
be dropped (or, as he put it, “we must kiss it goodbye”)’. To try to find some
way of  serving Byrnes’ purpose Bevin urged the British Government to cede
Tarawa in the Gilbert and Ellice Island, where the United States marines had
fought a great battle against the Japanese. But the British Cabinet was
unmoved by his plea. They argued that, in addition to particular objections,
‘proposals for the cession of British territory ought only to be considered as
part of some general scheme for common defence’. When this was reported
to the Prime Ministers Conference the Australians and New Zealanders
welcomed the decision.56
Nevertheless Attlee was quite worried by Byrnes’ blank refusal to
contemplate the possibility of a Southwest Pacific defence arrangement. It
seemed that if the Commonwealth countries insisted on this condition they
might well kill any chance of keeping the Americans interested in co-operative
action in the region. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting on 6
May Attlee elaborated on this difficulty and intimated that ‘it would be
necessary to some extent to meet Mr Byrnes’s desire to limit the scope of the
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discussions.’ Evatt, speaking in the place of Chifley who had had to return
home, would not, however, make any concessions. He thought Byrnes’ claim
that the United States had no defence interest in the area was not credible. If
the Americans wanted rights to the base they should be willing to assume
obligations. He said that he had discussed the matter with Chifley and they
were agreed that the Commonwealth Governments should ‘act together’ and
‘hold to the general principle that rights should be granted only on the basis
of reciprocal obligations.’ He did not believe that this was Byrnes’ last word.
The Australians were not wedded to any particular forms. The Canadian-
American mutual defence arrangement would be an acceptable model. The
Commonwealth should not close the door but take up Byrnes’ offer to speak
to himself and the New Zealand External Affairs Minister in Washington. But
by this time the British had grown a little weary of Australian intransigence.
Australia was not to have matters all its own way. Its absolute veto on any
other course of action was modified. And with Evatt reserving his position the
meeting agreed to tell the Americans that ‘while desirous of agreeing to
arrangements which would be satisfactory to the United states and
themselves’ the Commonwealth Governments ‘must have regard to their
common interests in the South Pacific’.57
Bevin was incensed by the attitude of his colleagues, and so returned to the
fray. He needed some gesture to help in securing not only the American loan
but also American aid in the Middle East. There was ‘no immediate possibility
of Byrnes entering four-party talks about the southern Pacific’. Rather he
believed that Byrnes was ‘getting the feeling that we stonewall on everything
and this is creating a good deal of impatience.’ The time had come ‘to make
some move favourable to the Americans’,  and  he asked Cabinet to
reconsider his Tarawa proposal, even in place of cession giving the
Americans a lease in perpetuity. But yet again his proposal was turned down.
Attlee, acutely aware that Australia and New Zealand were opposed to
handing over any territory to the Americans without a quid pro quo, replied
that the Tarawa question could only be considered ‘as part of general
arrangement in which Australia and New Zealand were fully associated’.58
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Frustrated by the Pacific Dominions’ attitude Bevin reported to Cabinet that
Byrnes was disappointed with the British Commonwealth countries’ response.
Since the Americans were not willing to enter into talks on the terms laid
down by the Commonwealth governments it seemed best that ‘this question
be allowed to lapse’.59 Bevin, however, did not want the question to lapse.
The base negotiations offered a means of binding the United States closer to
the British Commonwealth and making the Americans more amenable to
other British objectives, financial as well as strategic. When the American
officials subsequently inquired about the prospects of an agreement, Bevin
was anxious to ensure that ‘discussions should not be regarded as broken
down’. He was happy that Evatt and Nash should meet Byrnes in Washington
for any such discussions, no matter how unlikely they might be to succeed,
would still ‘help to keep the negotiations alive’.60
Chifley when reporting to parliament on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers
Conference repeated the statement on Australian defence policy which he
had made in London, namely that Australia’s contribution to British
Commonwealth defence could best be made in the Pacific and that the
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand should join in a common
scheme of defence which could be extended first to include the United States
and then other countries in the region. Why he should have put forward this
tripartite British Commonwealth scheme as a nucleus for the wider
arrangement is not clear. Nothing in London had given any indication that
that was how the British, the New Zealanders or Evatt envisaged a Pacific
defence plan emerging. All seemed to accept that American membership
from the beginning was essential. It is also uncertain whether Chifley in
making this statement was aware of the breakdown in base negotiations
which had happened after his departure. Evatt’s only communication on the
subject had been upbeat. He had told Chifley that after talking to Byrnes it
was evident that ‘our attitude at London was right; the door to negotiations
has not been closed and that despite all difficulties, satisfactory arrangements
may result’. He said that Byrnes wished to take up the matter in Washington
‘in accordance with an agreed note he received from Bevin’ following the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers meetings on the subject.61 This may well
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have misled Chifley about the great gap which existed between what
Australia desired and what America was willing to do.
While Chifley stressed the British Commonwealth connection Evatt’s priority
was the United States security guarantee. During Evatt’s talks at every level
in Washington this was the exclusive aim of his diplomacy. But at every level
he found that the Americans ruled out the possibility of any kind of regional
defence arrangement. In the face of President Truman’s rejection of any kind
of treaty, Evatt retreated to ‘an informal statement of policy’ which would
make ‘it clear that the defence of Australia  and New Zealand was involved
and not merely the defence of particular bases’. This too failed to elicit a
positive response. In his desperate endeavour to rescue something from the
talks he proposed at a meeting with State Department officials and
representatives of the Navy and Army Departments that the United States
might be given the right to use Manus and other Australian port facilities in
return for Australian services having the right to use United States bases in
the North Pacific such as Truk or Guam. Such an agreement, Evatt informed
Chifley, would ‘appear clearly as a mutual defence arrangement of a practical
kind, showing to the world that the countries concerned, using common
facilities in time of peace, would almost certain to be working together in time
of war’. Even this kind of limited tie would have then the desired result of
binding the United States to the defence of Australia. All of these negotiations
had proceeded without a word to the British. Chifley in principle approved,
with some qualifications, the new direction that Evatt’s negotiations had
taken. The Prime Minister said that an informal statement of policy, if it were
secured, should be supplemented by staff conversations between the
representatives of the armed forces of both countries and the preparation of a
contingency plan. Such staff talks had taken place prior to the outbreak of the
Pacific War and it was sensible that the same co-operation should be part of
any postwar defence arrangement no matter how informal. Furthermore
Chifley pointed out to Evatt that any agreeement about mutual access to
bases would have to include the United Kingdom and New Zealand  since ‘a
British Commonwealth plan for co-operation in Defence in the Pacific’ would
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necessarily require that these facilities be available to all three nations.
Chifley, in contrast to Evatt, never lost sight of the idea that the desired
Pacific defence arrangement  should be between the British Commonwealth,
including Britain, and the United States.
Evatt, however, was left with little choice. The ‘informal statement of policy’
was not an option. All that he could salvage from the grand scheme for a
defence arrangement for the Pacific was the possibility of reciprocal use of
bases, and in his final round of talks with the State Department  and service
officials on 30 June he focused all his efforts on this. As he put it to Chifley in
justification for the tactic, ‘The essential feature of our approach to the
problem has been to associate the use of Manus with other bases and
territories in the South West Pacific Region and to see that if United States
gets the use of facilities they will be required in return to give us definite and
tangible benefits of a Defence character’.  The precise bases to be included
in the plan were to be determined in subsequent discussions though he again
mentioned Guam and Manus as possible equivalents. He claimed that his
alternative reciprocal base plan ‘could properly be regarded as a practical
arrangement’ which could ‘also lead to assumption of definite obligations at a
later period’. It might even prove to be more satisfactory than the original
scheme in that the alternative plan would be ‘a visible manifestation of long-
term Defence association for mutual benefit’. As almost an afterthought he
admitted Chifley’s contention that ‘the United Kingdom and New Zealand
would have to participate in the plan’.
Two weeks later he was able to report that after a further conference with
Byrnes the Americans had now accepted in principle the reciprocal use of
bases, and in exchange for access to Manus would offer Australia facilities ‘at
some place, or places, to be determined’. Evatt had suggested Guam. He
then pronounced this to be a great victory. Britain and New Zealand as well
as Australia would benefit from the deal; ‘Australia’s self-respect as well as
her vital interests in British Commonwealth would be assisted by the new
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proposal’. The reciprocal exchange would be ‘a crushing answer to those in
Australia who would give away control or use of Australia territories without
getting anything in return.’ He claimed that Australia was ‘one of the leading
nations outside of the major powers themselves’ and that the United States
was ‘treating us in that way’. But this was a puff. He had misled Chifley about
the Americans’ attitude to reciprocity. They had ruled out the possibility of
giving the Australians rights in Guam or indeed any other of their bases in the
North Pacific. All that they would be willing to entertain was to allow
Australian use of Eastern Samoa or Canton Island, if they could acquire the
latter from the British - small facilities in the central or eastern Pacific far away
from the forward lines of defence which the Australian Government had
identified as the barrier against future threat. The American interest in Manus
was political not strategic; they wished to show the American taxpayers and
Congress that they had gained some long term rights in exchange for the
great wartime investment. Japan which was ‘flat on her face’ was no longer
considered a potential enemy against which they needed to protect
themselves.62 It took a long leap of a self-serving imagination to believe that
such a modest exchange, even if it could be negotiated - the  great question
of cost had not been touched on - might result in a defence arrangement of
the type which Evatt and the Australian Government, without considering the
American side of the equation, had blithely hoped they could achieve. The
Australian government was by this time under attack in the press and
parliament over Manus, it being asserted that the Labor ministers might by
failing to reach an agreement with the United States over Manus cause the
Americans to withdraw from the South Pacific. Thus the cabinet was cheered
by Evatt’s news and approved in principle his latest scheme63
Evatt let the matter lie dormant until after the Australian elections in
September. He then approached the American Ambassador in Canberra
about commencing negotiations over mutual use of Manus and ‘at least a
token right for mutual use of facilities in at least one American base’. The
State Department rejected again any possibility of allowing Australia the right
to use Guam and offered access to facilities only at Pago Pago in Eastern
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Samoa and at Canton. Moreover as they had indicated in their earlier draft
agreement for Manus they expected Australia to accept financial
responsibility for the upkeep of that base. Early in 1947 Australia seemed to
accept the essence of the American proposal and suggested that Australian
and American representatives should ‘examine the arrangements in detail’.
Evatt at a meeting of Council of Defence ministers gave a positive account of
the American proposal. He explained that the Americans did not wish to
become ‘entangled with us’ in a regional security arrangment or to give
Australia reciprocal rights in any of their North Pacific bases. They would only
give Australia reciprocal rights in Pago Pago and Canton and would not
contribute to the upkeep of Manus. But he argued that, even though the offer
‘did not go as far as we would have liked, and was, perhaps, of doubtful
practical value for Australian defence, nevertheless it was a recognition of
United States willingness to make an arrangement on the principle of
reciprocity and it represented an initial step in the direction of co-operation
with the United States in the Pacific, which it was Australia’s aim to foster’. He
admitted that ‘The existence of a United States screen of islands north of the
Equator was, of course, an important factor in our security’. He was ‘inclined
to favour’ the American offer.64
At the ensuing Council of Defence meeting, though the base issue as such
was not discussed, the Prime Minister noted that the ‘system of Empire Co-
operation is now greatly weakened’. It was evident that Britain had lost much
of its former power and potential. It had handed over to the Americans
responsibility for meeting the Soviet challenge in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Its position in the Middle East was under threat. India appeared ‘to be on the
way out’. Canada and South Africa were ‘non-co-operative’. Only Britain,
Australia and New Zealand believed in Empire unity and were willing to co-
operate in a plan for the common security. Australia had to formulate its
defence policy in the light of these considerations. And the Council endorsed
Chifley’s conclusion that, while world collective security was a long term
hope, ‘In the meantime, reliance must be placed on co-operation in Empire
Defence and the development of regional security in the Pacific with the
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United States’.65 The United States had to be allied to the British
Commonwealth in order to attain a satisfactory basis for national security.
The Americans, however, had begun to lose interest in Manus. Following the
Congressional elections the political issue had faded away. Simultaneously
Russia had appeared as the new enemy and Western Europe and the Near
East had become the critical areas of instablity and danger. On reassessing
their strategic needs the Americans had decided that Manus was no longer
important. Consequently after carrying away almost everything that was
movable from Manus they returned the base to Australia. Evatt was deeply
frustrated by American intransigence. In June 1947 Australia  Admiral Louis
E. Denfield presented a note to the Australian Government which seemed to
settle the matter once and for all. The Americans announced that they were
‘withdrawing’ their request for use of Manus, stating that among other
reasons it was ‘of slight strategic interest to the United States in view of the
base facilities available to the United States  in the former Japanese
mandated islands and in the Philippines’. Evatt was greatly disappointed and,
despite the clear American position, told the American Ambassador that
Australia and the United States should have a regional agreement similar to
that which the United States had with Canada or with the South American
countries in the recently signed Rio Pact.66
Fear of Japan had driven the Australians to seek to bind themselves to
America so that they would be able to have the same degree of security in
peace against an attack from the north as they had enjoyed during the Pacific
War. The latter protection had been unanticipated and had come about
through adventitious events. By committing America to a regional defence
arrangement they wanted America to act as a shield against any further
threats arising out of Asia, specifically Japan. In approaching the British they,
along with the New Zealanders, had insisted that their views on American
claims to islands and bases should prevail, and the British, for the good of the
Commonwealth, had acquiesced in the Australian negotiating terms which
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were designed to achieve these ends. But  Australian hopes were dashed
when the Americans made it clear that they were not interested in any such
arrangement and they evaporated altogether when the Americans in mid-
1947 lost all interest in South Pacific bases. As a result the British
Commonwealth was left without a policy for the defence of its interests in
East Asia and the Pacific. The Australians still thought of themselves as
taking part in a co-operative British Commonwealth defence, but when it
came to the point they found it difficult to give meaning to this concept without
the co-operation of the Americans.
The Making of a Japanese Peace Treaty.
As the Allies’ defeat of Japan drew near both the Australian and British
Governments had independently formulated principles for the remaking of
Japan. The Australians, even before the end of the Pacific War, had told the
British that they feared a resurgence of Japanese militarism and  supported a
‘stern’ occupation policy. In particular they wanted the Emperor system
destroyed. As they  told London ‘the visible dethronement’ of that system was
‘a primary means of shaking the faith of the Japanese in the heavenly
character of the Emperor’. They maintained that ‘Unless the system goes the
Japanese will remain unchanged and the recrudescence of aggression will
only be postponed to a later generation’.  Both governments, without
informing the other, submitted their ideas on what the Australians called ‘The
Future of Japan’ to the Americans. While the British only sought
demilitarisation and external controls - having little faith in cultural engineering
- the Australians demanded a root and branch policy which, beginning with
the abolition of the sacred emperor, would involve ‘radical changes in Japan’s
social, political and economic pattern’. Only by this means could they effect
the ‘Elimination of Japanese militarism and its constant threat to Pacific
security’.67
Even though Australia represented the British Commonwealth on the Allied
Council in Tokyo and was a member of the FEC in Washington, Evatt
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remained unhappy with the way in which the Americans dominated the
occupation. He disliked SCAP’s unilateral actions, including MacArthur’s
devising of a new constitution, and also the Great Powers’ right of veto in the
FEC which allowed the American government by default a very free hand in
making occupation policy. He recognised that  American  policy was by a
piecemeal process creating the terms of a peace settlement. To head this off
he began to urge on the British the need for an early Peace Conference
where Australia could have some influence on the outcome. In April 1946
during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting  Hector McNeill, the
British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, recorded that Evatt, speaking to
him of the necessity of holding an early peace conference, had ‘returned to
his old subject with much greater warmth’.68
During 1946 Evatt became ever more convinced of  the desirability of
reaching a formal peace settlement and of ensuring that Australia was a party
principal in the making of the peace. The Great Powers in drawing up
European peace terms had ignored the lesser Allies. He  fought hard to
persuade them to allow a conference of all the Allies who had taken part in
the European war to review the terms, and with the support of the British
whom he lobbied on behalf of a broad-based conference he had his way. It
was only reluctantly conceded and the conference could only by a two thirds
vote recommend revisions. The Soviet Union was of all the Great Powers the
most resistant to permitting the small belligerents a voice. Evatt in pursuing
his objective crossed swords with the Soviet representatives. In writing to Ball
about the attitude he should take in dealing with the American-Soviet
disputes on the Allied Council Evatt said that as a result of his dealings with
the Soviet Union he was ‘satisfied that they are conducting an offensive of
nerves against Western countries’. The Soviets at international conferences
had adopted ‘tactics well-known in Communist circles of standard obstruction,
sabotage and determination to win by resorting to weapons of fatigue and
almost open intimidation.’69 But for him the European peace conference was a
very disappointing experience. On the question of the disposal of the Italian
colonies in North Africa, he had wanted the decision left in the hands of the
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belligerents, including the small powers. He fought bitterly against a majority
view that it should be left to the Great Powers and if they failed to agree
referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations. He saw this as
setting a dangerous precedent for the settlement with Japan. He was fearful
that if this was accepted, it might ‘create disastrous precedence (sic) to
Pacific settlement’. Though there had been much consultation among the
British Commonwealth countries about the matter, Evatt was ‘disgusted’ at
the lack of support from the British and the other Dominions. Their attitude
represented ‘appeasement of Russia and forgetfulness of Australia’s
maximum war effort’. He insisted that Australia would ‘not submit to similar
action in relation to the Pacific settlement as our life as a nation may be
affected’.70
Evatt had lost all patience with the Americans. They had rejected his regional
defence plans, had ignored his protests against the Japanese undertaking an
Antarctic whaling expedition and, in general, were bypassing the FEC in their
administration of occupied Japan. He wished to halt the proliferation of ad
hoc decisions which were preempting the work of the peace conference. In
October he had told the British that Australia was opposed to the FEC
discussing the disposal of the Japanese fleet, saying that it should be left  for
the peace conference.71 The British were surprised at this since it seemed
that if the FEC did not act it might be left wholly in the hands of the United
States. But Evatt had arrived at the conclusion that the FEC was acting in
collusion with the Americans in agreeing to deal with issues that rightly
belonged to the overall peace settlement.72
In early 1947 Evatt publicly called for the summoning of a peace conference.
Perhaps he was encouraged to take this action by President Truman’s State
of the Union Address in which he said that the time had arrived ‘to get on with
the peace settlements’ and by MacArthur’s message to the American
Congress that the basic tasks of the occupation had been completed.73 In a
parliamentary speech on Australia’s foreign relations the External Affairs
Minister broached the question. He stressed once again that Australia’s
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overriding concern was protection against a resurgent Japanese militarism.
‘First and foremost’, he said ‘in Australian policy in regard to the future of
Japan we place security.’ It was Australia’s core aim that ‘Japan must never
again be permitted to develop the means of waging aggressive war’. There
had been a ‘distinct tendency [and the tone suggested a regrettable
tendency] to settle matters piecemeal or on a temporary basis’. It was his
considered opinion that ‘the time is rapidly approaching when the FEC’s work
should be vested in a Pacific Peace Conference which could deal with the
problems of the settlement with Japan as a whole’. The Conference should
be composed of the Pacific nations that ‘waged active war’ against Japan
and no power should have a right to veto the decisions of the conference.
Furthermore he indicated that the signing of a peace treaty would not mean
that the Allies would no longer exercise some supervision over Japan. It
would not necessarily follow that the making of peace would bring about the
withdrawal of Allied forces from Japan.74
A few weeks later MacArthur, who was aware of Evatt’s speech, came out
publicly in favour of an early peace settlement. He claimed that the ‘aims of
the occupation certainly have been accomplished’. The demilitarisation had
been completed and the democratisation was ‘approaching completion’. Only
the problems of economic reconstruction remained to be solved. This could
not be done by the occupation. Japan needed a peace treaty to enable it to
resume trade and take full economic responsibility for itself. The American
State Department responded positively to MacArthur’s proposal and set
about drawing up plans for a peace conference.75
For Australia, Britain and the British Commonwealth as a whole it seemed
that the critical hour for the making of peace with Japan had arrived; both
Australia and Britain were concerned that the United States might present
them with a fait accompli. But for Australia above all the Japanese peace was
the major issue of the postwar era. Thus Evatt from the outset had as his aim
the calling of a British Commonwealth Conference in Australia which would at
the end submit  its ‘agreed views’ to Washington. He wished to emphasise
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again that the Pacific Dominions were the party principals for the
Commonwealth in the Pacific. In opposing a British proposal to hold a
conference in London, he argued that Australia and New Zealand were ‘the
British Commonwealth countries most vitally affected by Japanese
Settlement’ and that ‘in the circumstances , our special interest in Pacific
should be recognised’. It was essential that the conference be held in
Australia. As Evatt explained to J.A. Beasley, the Australian High
Commisioner in London, it was important to ensure that the British did not
‘monopolise the initiative in relation to this matter, in dealing with Washington’
since Australia had ‘to bear the burden of these moves.’ He recalled the
British failure to consult with Australia both during the war and in the postwar
period about their Asian and the Pacific policies and he complained about
their indifference to  Australian interests. In particular he noted Britain’s
decisions to withdraw from India and Burma and its consideration of similar
actions in Ceylon and Malaya. Australia was left ‘without any adequate
defence arrangements...which...seems to follow a pattern.’ And he cited
Britain’s committing the United States to a ‘Beat Hitler First’ strategy when
Australian forces were fighting in the Middle East. He concluded that Britain
‘which cannot have a primary interest everywhere, should actively support
Australian leadership in relation to Commonwealth interest in the Pacific’.
Aware of its own weakness and sensitive to Australia’s concerns the Attlee
government, following the precedent set in the appointment of the
Commonwealth representative on the Allied  Council gave in to the
Australians and it was agreed that a conference should be held in Canberra
at the end of August.76
In March Evatt established a Preparatory Committee for the Pacific
Settlement under the chairmanship of Sir Frederic Eggleston. For Australia,
as Evatt told Parliament, the most important consideration was the need to
ensure effective supervision of Japan after the signing of the peace, and it
was to this question that the Committee gave a great deal of its attention. In a
draft outline of a treaty drawn up by the Committee, Evatt reported to Cabinet
in May  that ‘special stress had been laid on the setting up of a body to be
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known as the Supervisory Commission for Japan’. This body made up of
representatives of the FEC powers would have ‘special machinery of control
and inspection’ for the purpose of overseeing ‘the implementation of the
terms of the Peace Treaty’. It was envisaged that small garrisons supplied by
the members of the Commission would replace the occupation forces. Again
in June after the British Commonwealth and the United States had accepted
the need for an early peace Evatt repeated this warning: ‘It is plain that the
future control and supervision of Japan will be the most important question for
the peace conference to decide. By no means should Japan be permitted to
imitate the example of Germany after World War One and emerge as a
menace to the security of the Pacific and Southeast Asia’. Evatt did allow for
the possibility that the Japanese people could be transformed into ‘a peaceful
democratic state’, but only ‘provided always’ that there was ‘adequate control’
and  the processes of social, economic and political reform continued.77  He
hoped that the British Commonwealth conference could be persuaded to
support the inclusion of strict control measures in the treaty.
The British, however, were alert to Evatt’s intent and made it clear that the
Conference’s purpose would be merely ‘to exchange views’. They stated that
‘the object of the Canberra Conference would not in our view...be to aim at
the production of any agreed British Commonwealth draft for the Japanese
treaty’. The Americans by this time had changed their mind on the nature of a
desirable peace. Not only were they anxious to encourage the Japanese to
revive their economy and so relieve America of the cost of the occupation but
also they wished to win Japan over to the side of the West in the emerging
Cold War with the Soviet Union. Major-General John H. Hilldring, the
Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, in June wrote to MacArthur
that the United States did ‘not any longer...concern itself with whether or not
we shall have a punitive peace. That is a closed issue.’ The government was
‘able henceforth to devote themselves to discussion and decision as to how
the constructive philosophy shall be devised and described’. The British were
very sensitive to American wishes, depending so much upon them for
economic assistance as well as strategic support in Europe and the Middle
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East. They had conceded the Far East to the Americans. In their view one of
the chief aims of the Canberra Conference would be to prepare the
Commonwealth countries for subsequent ‘informal’ talks with the Americans.78
Evatt was not easily dissuaded from persisting in his course. On 8 July before
heading off to Japan to consult with MacArthur about SCAP’s progress in
reforming Japan and to seek his support for Australia’s peace terms, Evatt
held a meeting of his chief advisers to discuss Australia’s tactics in working
towards a Japanese peace treaty. The verbatim record of the meeting is a
most remarkable document, firstly because of its very existence - Evatt was
averse normally to having records made of his informal discussions - and
secondly because  of what it reveals about Evatt’s political character as well
as his view of the peacemaking and the role the British Commonwealth
countries and the Canberra Conference should play in achieving Australia’s
objectives. Turning to Eggleston at the outset he declared that on his return
from Japan he would want to talk to the new Advisory Committee which had
superseded the Preparatory Committee, and he hoped that the Committee
would prove to be ‘an anti-Japanese Committee and not an appeasing
committee’.  Evatt was critical of America’s design ‘to build up Japan against
Russia.’ According to Eggleston if this were to happen ‘a reading of history
shows that she may go with Russia’.
Evatt was adamant that it should not be the members of the FEC as such
who should participate in the peace-making but only those nations who had
actively fought against the enemy. And in this respect he was as hostile to
the participation of other Commonwealth countries as he was to the non-
Commonwealth countries. All of them, he believed, had either betrayed
Australia or were indifferent to its Pacific concerns. He could not appreciate
any other nation’s perspective and was narrowly focused on achieving his
own objectives.
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Dr. Evatt: Why should Canada for instance be in the Peace Settlement?
They will, I think, follow the U.S. in a crisis or will sit on the fence. They
will sign anything.
Mr. Forsyth: They were cautious but acted in their interests.
Dr. Evatt: South Africa should not be in the Peace Settlement....
Mr.Forsyth: Shouldn’t the criterion be active participation in the war
against Japan?
Dr.Evatt: Then we should cut out France and the Netherlands.
Mr.Forsyth: That would limit to the Big Five.
Dr. Evatt: I don’t mind the Big Five if Australia is one of them.
Mr. Forsyth: What about New Zealand?
Dr.Evatt: The same thing applies. Mr Curtin was horrified when New
Zealand did not give a division in the Pacific war.
It was Australia’s policy to have unanimity as the rule for deciding the terms
of peace at the eventual conference, which in effect would give all members
of the conference, including Australia, a right of veto. When Dr John Burton,
the new Secretary of the External Affairs Department, urged that Australia
‘should make sure that the United Kingdom and other British Commonwealth
countries don’t go back on voting arrangements made at the Canberra
Conference’, Evatt answered that even Britain could not be relied upon for
‘U.K. policy is to give concessions in the Pacific for similar ones in Europe’.
The United States’ sensitivities were also brushed aside. When Eggleston
remarked that  the ‘U.S. objects to blocs’ Evatt defiantly declared, ‘Be
damned! They do it themselves’. Evatt advocated a policy of sheer
expediency in approaching the question of who should decide the peace with
Japan. Since he had blamed the Great Powers and their vetoes for the failure
of the peace negotiations and the breakdown in the United Nations, it was
rather ironic that he was willing himself to countenance a Great Power peace
for Japan provided that Australia was accepted as one of the Great Powers.79
In Japan Evatt wanted to discuss with MacArthur not only the reforms made
by the occupation but also the ‘vital question’ of post-peace treaty controls
and with it Australian security. As so often was the case with Evatt when face
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to face with the leaders of Australia’s Great Power allies his defiant posture
dissolved in the presence of the international statesman and after his talks
with SCAP he praised publicly the commander’s achievement in practically
completing the physical disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan and
expressed the belief that there was a ‘substantial area of agreement’ with the
United States authorities in Japan on peace terms. There are no Australian
minutes or other detailed records of Evatt’s discussions with MacArthur but
the American and British political liaison officers sent their respective
governments similar accounts of what had transpired. The American reported
that Evatt’s attitude had been ‘cordial and friendly in every way’ and the
British representative stated that Dr Evatt spoke to him ‘with the voice of
MacArthur’ and that it appeared from what he said that Evatt had ‘evidently
found almost complete common ground with the Commander on the
questions at issue.’ He had told the Americans that as to the peace he was
‘completly optimistic that basic American and British Commonwealth policies
were  identical’.
In addressing, however, the problem of supervising and enforcing the peace
Evatt linked the issue of controls to that of establishing a Pacific defence
arrangement and so obtaining the United States security guarantee which
had eluded him in the negotiations over the Pacific bases. He confided to the
head of the British Liaison Mission that ‘the most important
consideration...was for the United States to retain her interest in strategical
questions affecting the defence of Japan after the treaty had been signed’. It
was his view that ‘The defence of Japan must be so arranged as to be able to
meet any contingencies which might arise either because of internal moves in
Japan herself or aggression from outside’. The chief of the American
Diplomatic Section of SCAP reported to Washington that Evatt’s plan  for
post-peace supervision included a council of ambassadors from the FEC
nations who, under the chairmanship of the American representative, ‘would
consult together under a regional security pact for the Far East’.80 Evatt wrote
to Chifley that not only was there ‘a complete over-all understanding’ with
MacArthur on peace conference procedures, peace terms and post peace
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controls but also there was an accord between MacArthur’s views on the
peace and Australia’s desire for protection agains ‘aggression from the
North’. 81
The ‘Outline Notes’ which Evatt put together after his return from Japan
provided the basis for discussion at the Canberra Conference. Despite the
British, Canadian and New Zealand wishes that nothing should be done to
fuel American fears of a Commonwealth bloc, Lord Addison, the leader of the
British delegation, reiterating that ‘we must confine ourselves simply to an
exchange of views’, it was clear that Evatt still wanted to establish a common
position which could be used at the peace conference to advance Australia’s
aims. And on many issues the British Commonwealth representatives did
share a common mind, a common mind that reflected for the most part
Australian objectives. As the final communique declared, while each nation
preserved its freedom of action, the conference had ‘revealed a wide
harmony of views among the British Commonwealth Nations’. Evatt argued
successfully, against a British case for majority voting, that two-thirds
majorities should be required to determine substantive issues at the peace
conference; not only was it the procedure adopted by the United Nations and
favoured by the United States but also because through this means
Commonwealth countries at the conference would have an effective veto
over the peace settlement. The Conference accepted that in accord with  the
Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam Great Power decisions Japan’s territory should be
limited to its four main islands, and no one dissented from the Australian view
that the remaining island groups to the south, the Ryukyus, the Bonins and
the Volcanoes, should be left under the control of the United States. Likewise
the Commonwealth representatives supported the principles of permanent
demilitarisation and disarmament, forbidding atomic research and
development and an aircraft industry and limiting the size of commercial ships
to the needs of coastal trade.  While acknowledging that Japan must be left
free to rebuild its economy so as to become self-sufficient they also thought
that it should be prevented from  recreating a war potential, and this was to
be achieved by placing limits on major industries and restricting imports of
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raw materials. The conference, moreover, favoured the Australian proposal
that Japan should protect and extend the  political and economic reforms
which SCAP had  instituted, though the members differed over how this
should be accomplished.82
Australia suffered the greatest setback over the issue of enforcing the peace.
Evatt, following the Provisional Agenda notes that he had distributed to all
delegates, set out three alternatives, all of which contemplated the use of
Allied forces, if necessary,  to compel Japan’s compliance with the terms of
the peace. The first allowed for the continuation of the military occupation
until a Supervisory Commission should decide that Japan had shown itself to
be trustworthy. The second envisaged the stationing of small garrisons at
designated points around Japan, garrisons which could be reinforced if need
be from bases on the surrounding islands and the third, assuming the
withdrawal of all occupying forces, looked to the treaty to give the
Supervisory Commission the right to keep garrisons on the adjacent islands
which could be called upon in order to maintain order in Japan or to deal with
violations of the peace terms.  The British, Canadian and Indian
representatives raised the many difficulties associated with these schemes
for possible post-peace treaty military intervention; Addison suggested control
of emigration or economic sanctions might be a better way of handling
infractions of the treaty terms. All were opposed to the continuation of the
occupation and recognised the difficulties of the Supervisory Commission
having the executive authority when in practice it would be the United States
that would supply the bulk of any force that might be used for enforcement
purposes. Evatt himself by that stage in the Conference’s proceedings had
realised that nothing could be decided on this matter without American co-
operation and so he declared that he was ‘most emphatically of the opinion
that we cannot advance very far without discussion with the United States’.
He had learnt as in the case of the Pacific bases  and security proposals that
the Commonwealth could not act alone, that it depended at the end of the
day on United States willingness to participate in such schemes. In the
desultory exchanges that ensued Evatt  made it plain that he supported some
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form of Pacific security  that could be used against the revival of Japanese
militarism. Drawing on his talks with MacArthur he admitted that the existing
large scale military occupation was no longer feasible. However it was his
hope that a small force of possibly battalion size would remain as a symbol of
the Supervisory Commission’s authority and that a reserve force would be
stationed in the nearby islands.  He did not wish the United States to use its
position to take exclusive control; it ‘would be a very bad thing for the Pacific
as a whole’. Countries like Australia and New Zealand would be placed at a
disadvantage. In his final contribution to the topic Evatt raised once again the
‘important question of regional arrangement in the Pacific’. It was his hope
that somehow in association with the peace treaty that there should be ‘an
undertaking against aggression in the Pacific’.83
This Commonwealth Conference, the first to be held in the Pacific, was
conducted in a most amicable manner. The British representatives who were
apprehensive at the outset reported favourably on the outcome. The
atmosphere was ‘outstandingly friendly’ and Dr.Evatt was ‘tactful and
considerate’, indeed ‘sweet reasonableness itself’. Perhaps since he had
succeeded in having the conference held in Australia and was as a result
elected chairman his vanity had been appeased and he went out of his way
to be conciliatory. But even more as the British noted - and it was a
characteristic which they applauded since this was largely what underlay their
apprehensions - Evatt was ‘throughout conscious of United States interests
and policies and was particularly anxious to do nothing to run counter to
them’. He had indicated that on ‘some important points’ no effective
discussion could take place in the absence of America.84 In some ways the
Canberra Conference was like the Imperial Conference of 1921 which until
America was brought into the discussion could not reach a common policy on
the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In this case, however, in contrast
to the earlier conference, Australia was almost as convinced as Canada that
they had to wait upon the Americans’ pleasure.
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Evatt on the very day that the conference ended sent an ingratiating cable to
American Secretary of State George Marshall which summarised the
proceedings in a manner which showed how the Commonwealth countries
had deferred to the United States and how he himself had insisted on peace
terms acceptable to the United States.  As he wrote
The broad result of the Conference is to confirm the initiative of the
United States and of General MacArthur in moving towards an early
settlement with Japan, which initiative has been supported throughout
by myself....
Australia has pressed the view that the chain of islands between Japan
and Formosa should be in the sovereignty or exclusive control of the
United States....
He praised General MacArthur’s ‘outstanding work’ in the field of
demilitarisation and disarmament, and maintained that after the peace the
Supervisory Commission should be able to help the Japanese to carry on the
work of democratisation, the framework for which had been established by
SCAP. On the matter of the occupation and future control of Japan he had
strongly urged that the United States should be first consulted; ‘Accordingly ,
there has been no attempt to reach any decision on occupation or control,
still less any attempt to bind each other as a group in any direction’. Finally he
declared that Australia had ‘always recognised the leadership of the United
States in the Pacific’, that Australia was second only to the United States in
prosecuting the War in the Pacific and that if the United States after the
signing of the peace treaty desired to keep forces in bases close to the
Japanese main islands ‘Australia would probably continue its share in
obligations under American command’. It was a plea to America to treat
Australia as a close friend in working out the ultimate peace terms. It was in
essence an appeal to America to support Australia’s claims to be regarded as
a ‘party principal’ in the peacemaking and peace enforcing.85
The euphoria of the Commonwealth conference quickly dissipated as it
became increasingly evident in the latter months of the year that there was
little chance of an early peace.  Russia objected to the American proposal
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that a peace conference  made up of all the FEC nations should negotiate the
peace terms. It wanted the matter to be left in the hands of the Council of
Foreign Ministers. China too was unhappy with the proposal that the
conference should make its decisions on the basis of a two-third majority. It
demanded that the veto rights which the great powers exercised in the FEC
should also apply at the peace conference. The Americans had committed
themselves to the FEC membership formula and the two third vote primarily
for the purpose of overcoming the Russian veto power which had contributed
to the difficulties that they had encountered in the FEC. By this time tensions
between the United States and the Soviet Union had reached a serious stage
and all international issues not only European ones were being increasingly
assessed from that particular perspective. From the enunciation of the
Truman Doctrine in March Russian-American relations had rapidly
deteriorated. The American national security establishment had come to
believe that not only was it impossible to obtain an agreement for the
settlement of the German question in Europe but also that the Soviet Union
was bent on world domination. Thus in Washington it was increasingly
believed that a disarmed Japan might well become an easy prey for the
Soviet Union and so their doubts had grown about the wisdom of holding a
peace conference which would weaken America’s influence over Japan.
Using therefore the Russian and  the Chinese objections as pretexts they
procrastinated over calling a conference.
Evatt was much vexed by the Russian and Chinese difficulties. He saw the
chance of an early peace slipping away. More immediately he feared that the
Americans might in order to achieve a treaty surrender to the recalcitrant
Great Powers and as a result Australia would be denied its place at the
peace table. As soon as these problems surfaced he emphasied yet again
Australians’ contribution to the Pacific War and the promises made to
Australia, and he pressed the Americans to ’take definitive action’  to call the
peace conference. Since the Russians and Chinese persisted with their
demands Evatt became alarmed that the Great Powers might, as they had
done in the European settlement, take it upon themselves to decide the terms
of the Japanese peace treaty or at the least insist on retaining the veto
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power. He was adamant that the British were ‘absolutely bound’ by the
Canberra conference to consult Australia before agreeing to any such
arrangements. He was determined that Australia ‘must at all costs maintain
our position’. But that position was not total opposition to the veto but rather
that Australia should exercise the right of veto for the British Commonwealth.
If Australia agreed to ‘a modified veto’, then he asserted that ‘It should  be on
the footing that Australia represent the British Commonwealth as at Tokyo’.
When, however, the Americans inquired of the British where they stood on
this matter they denied that Australia had made such representations and
assured the United States that even if it did they would be rejected.86
The Cold War, the Japanese Peace Treaty and Pacific Security.
By the end of 1947 the tensions between the Western great powers and the
Soviet Union had hardened into a Cold War. The Americans and British
adopted a global policy of confrontation aimed at containing the Soviet threat.
They had little expectation of reaching a diplomatic settlement with Russia on
any of the major post-war international issues, including Germany and Japan.
Thus at the London conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in
December 1947, Marshall and Bevin had not made any serious effort to
engage their Soviet counterpart in discussions on these problems. Rather
they had consulted with each other on how best to meet the Soviet menace
to Western Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East  and
East Asia. They had tentatively agreed to co-operate in building up their
defences to resist Communist expansion, the Americans making a secret
commitment to support the British in the Eastern Mediterranean and the
Middle East, the British undertaking to initiate a Western European union and
both promising to enter into talks about the security of East Asia.
Against this background, however, the Americans, British and Australians
took up different stands on the desirability of a Japanese peace treaty. The
Americans abandoned the idea of an early  peace. Economic considerations
were subsumed by strategic ones. They wanted to ensure that Russia would
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not be able to take advantage of a weak Japan. American policymakers,
ignoring the limits which had been laid down by the FEC, set about restoring
Japan’s industrial capacity and encouraging its de facto reentry into the
international community.  While keeping their military forces in Japan they
hoped through this ‘reverse’ economic policy to integrate Japan into the
Western camp. The British for their part though they were loth to challenge
the Americans openly nevertheless favoured the calling of an early Peace
Conference with or without Russian participation. In order to meet the
security problem they thought that the Japanese peace treaty should be
accompanied by a Japanese-American defence treaty and the Americans,
British, Australians, New Zealanders and Canadians should enter into a
mutual pact or agreement for the defence of the whole region.
On the Australian side, however, there was great resentment at America’s
unilateral change of course. Australia saw itself as only second in importance
to America in the Pacific settlement. From the World War II experience it was
convinced that it was the most vulnerable of the Western powers to a threat
from the region, particularly a revival of Japanese militarism. The Labor
government had little sympathy for the American and British anxieties about
Soviet actions in Europe. They saw these preoccupations as distracting
attention from the Pacific and providing a pretext for putting off the
summoning of a peace conference. Since the Americans and British had
failed to make any progress Evatt considered approaching the Soviet union
to see if he could break the impasse. Acting on the assumption that if the
Soviet Union was reassured about its post-Yalta territorial gains in Northeast
Asia it might well be willing to drop its opposition to a broad based peace
conference and so force America’s hand, Burton on behalf of Evatt instructed
Australia’s minister in Moscow to sound out the Russians accordingly - but
without any success.87 The American attitude was deeply frustrating and there
seemed no way around the problem.
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Thus though Chifley endorsed the secret Anglo-American understanding
about the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East - perhaps because it
had direct strategic implications for Australia - he refused, on the advice of
Burton and Evatt, to back a British plan for a Western union aimed at
containing Russia in Europe. Indeed Australia was the only ‘old Dominion’ to
oppose the British proposal. The Australian reply to the British, which was
drafted by Burton, was couched in the language of liberal internationalism. It
asserted that an anti-Soviet pact would be contrary to the principles of the
United Nations. If agreed to it would amount to a return to power politics
which had been the major cause of earlier wars. Such a scheme represented
a return to a diplomacy based on strategy and expediency rather than justice.
By ganging up on the Soviet Union the West would only confirm Russian
suspicions and consolidate the polarisation which was endangering world
peace. But throughout this extensive critique the Australians laid the blame
for this unfortunate state of affairs on the United States. Britain might be
taking the initiative but it was implied that they were acting at the instance of
the Americans. It was suggested that the British Labour government was
acting under economic duress and following the Americans in this anti-Soviet
crusade. The Americans because of their support for the arms industry and
failure to provide economic aid for the war-torn countries had contributed
greatly to world tensions. They had little feeling for Britain’s plight. They were
willing to pour capital into the revival of the economies of the former enemies,
Japan, Germany and Italy, rather than to help Britain which had borne the
heat and burden of the Western cause in World War II. The Australian
response hinted that if the British pursued this American-devised plan they
might well be left as had been the case in the early years of World War II to
carry the full cost of a future conflict.
Why did Australia stand apart and reject this British proposal? They had
accepted the Mediterranean and Middle East understanding which was
equally aimed at the Soviet Union. Why did they believe that the principles
underlying the United Nations were being broken when Britain, America, the
other Dominions, France and the small Western European countries agreed
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that such a union was necessary to defend these same principles against a
new imperialist aggressor? Why did they shift the blame for the British
proposal onto the Americans when it was clear that the British for their own
reasons had taken the initiative? The answer would seem to be that they
feared that the British plan was based on the assumption that Anglo-
American differences with the Soviets were irreconcilable and that therefore
their energies would be devoted to the European crisis at the expense of the
Asia Pacific region.  And as at the time of the making of the ANZAC Pact their
hostility was directed primarily at the Americans. Without the co-operation of
the Americans the Australians could not achieve their Pacific objectives and
since the end of the war the Americans had rebuffed all their overtures. The
Americans had refused to go along with Australia’s scheme for  Pacific bases
or a Pacific defence arrangement, they had procrastinated over the calling of
a peace conference and they had acted unilaterally in  deciding occupation
policy even to the point where they were willing to assist rebuilding Japan’s
industrial infrastructure. Britain and America were once again pursuing a
‘Europe first’ policy. Australia was again beginning to feel itself ‘alone in the
Pacific’. And so at the conclusion of Australia’s reply to Britain, after the
condemnation of the violations of liberal internationalist principles, Chifley told
Attlee that Australia’s  ‘interests were very much bound up in the Pacific area:
in the event of European conflict, our whole manpower might well have to be
diverted to the protection of our position and interests in this area’. Australia’s
position was precarious for ‘there is no Government in the Southeast Asia or
Pacific areas which is stable: every Government can be prevailed upon to
adopt a policy hostile to us if it so suited powers engaged in a European
conflict’.88 One might well wonder whether this last enigmatic comment might
be a reference to Communist influence upon the national independence
movements in Asia or to a revitalised Japan which might be encouraged by
the Soviet Union to take the opportunity to revenge itself on Australia.
A few months later in a report to parliament on foreign affairs Evatt, while
praising American aid to Europe under the  Marshall plan and the formation
of the Western Union as ‘a contribution to the stability and economic welfare
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of Europe’, nevertheless deplored the growth of ‘fears and suspicions’
between Russia and America which had stultified all efforts to achieve a
peace treaty  and caused the Americans to rebuild Japan’s industry beyond
the previously agreed limits. Japan was ‘itself an illustration of the general
world situation.’ The recent State and Army Department missions to Japan
had produced reports favouring ‘the restoration of industries which might
enable Japan to rearm for war’. The Americans saw Japan as a resource
which ‘might be used as an instrument in a future struggle between the
United States of America and the Soviet Union’. He questioned the wisdom of
such a policy for though Japan might be rebuilt as an arsenal for one
purpose, namely to assist the West against Russia, ‘it might ultimately be
used according to the wishes of the Japanese leaders and turned in the
direction of the South Pacific to the detriment of this country’. It would be an
‘evil day for Australia if Japan is given capacity to rearm’.89
This protest at America’s global role, especially its attitude towards Japan,
was but a mild and, for public purposes, diplomatic expression of the anger
which Evatt felt. On the day after delivering this speech he unburdened
himself to the British High Commissioner in Canberra and elaborated in detail
on his distrust of America’s global policy, especially as it affected Japan,
Palestine and Trieste. If the British record is accurate - and there is no reason
to doubt it - Evatt inveighed against the United States using the crudest kind
of populist socialist language. It was the wildness of a frustrated ego which
had fused the pursuit of his nation’s interests with his own self-righteous
vanity. American policy, he declared, was ‘revealed as mercenary and
opposed to any system of democracy as we understood it’. The Americans
were ‘more concerned about their own financial interests than the peace of
the world’. Their actions had in the main been ‘dominated by vested interests
which took the form of anti-communism which could not be distinguished from
anti-socialism’, and he gave as an example the United States ‘supplying
Japan with many millions of dollars of raw cotton to build up their textile
industry which would mean American machinery and replacements’.
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America’s policy towards rebuilding Japan’s economy was intended to make
that country ‘a bulwark against communism’.
In this same conversation Evatt expressed understanding for Britain’s
position. He had ‘a high admiration for the way the Government and people
of the United Kingdom were facing their great trials’. It was because of
Britain’s great sacrifices in the war that it found itself obliged to seek aid from
the United States. The crippling conditions placed on the American loans
were the result of ‘American suspicions of a Labour Government in Britain’.
The United States was ‘anti-Labour in outlook and conduct’. He projected
again a ludicrous image of the British Labour Government which served his
own emotional needs. In contrast to his sweeping denunciation of the British
at the Departmental meeting preceding the Canberra Conference he now
saw them as the wartime heroes who because of their unhappy economic
circumstances had had to bow before American demands. He proposed to
the High Commissioner that ‘the three Labour Governments of the British
Commonwealth should devise a common policy and form some kind of social
democratic nucleus which could act as a midway power between United
States individualism and Soviet communism and so secure the peace of the
world’. The High Commissioner  noted that ‘Dr.Evatt has been changing his
attitude towards the United Kingdom and veering from his earlier attitude of
closer co-operation with the United States’. He could not help but wonder
after listening to Evatt whether the latter was not beginning to realise that
‘putting all one’s money on the United Nations is a risky policy and that
greater reliance should be placed in a strong Commonwealth’, though, if this
were the case, from the account of the talk, he would have had to be thinking
of a Commonwealth composed only of Britain, Australia and New Zealand.90
The British too were concerned about the Americans’ failure to consult them
about East Asian policy, particularly their policy towards Japan and the calling
of a peace conference. Unlike the Australians, however, they were troubled
not so much by the anti-Soviet character of America’s change of course as by
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the seeming unwillingness to consult them and take their assessment of the
East Asian situation into account. In particular they considered that
‘prolonged occupation will only cause dissatisfaction amongst the Japanese
and make them unwilling to pull their proper weight’ and that ‘failure on the
part of the Western Powers to conclude a treaty [with Japan] is likely to have
an adverse reaction upon their position in the Asiatic area’. Following his talks
with Marshall in London Bevin had been thwarted in his desire to take the
matter further because of American  and British doubts about Australian
ability to guarantee the confidentiality of secret talks and documents. The
British accepted that they could not proceed without the co-operation of
Australia and New Zealand. Very conscious of Australia’s sensitivities about
Asia and the Pacific the British knew that proceeding without the Dominions’
participation would be to court a serious breach in Commonwealth relations.
Moreover the Dominions were important for both British Asian and global
policy.91
By April it was clear that Australia had little sympathy for the Anglo-American
strategy aimed at containing the Soviet Union in Europe and that it was very
unhappy with America’s high-handed actions over Japan. Therefore at
Bevin’s suggestion the British government decided to send Esler Dening,
Assistant Under Secretary of State for Far East Asian Affairs, as  an envoy to
the Pacific to consult directly with Australia, New Zealand and Canada and to
explain at first hand the reasons for their new approach to the Soviet Union
and to seek the ‘old Dominions’ consent to joining in secret talks with the
United States about a common East Asian policy. Bevin, despite the fact that
the Australian security issue had not been resolved, had become ‘seriously
concerned’  at the delay in commencing the talks with the Americans about
East Asia. Until the British had exchanged views with the Americans it was
‘impossible to determine our Far East policy’. In addition it was possible that
unless the talks were held soon, ‘particularly in regard to Japan, the
Americans may make up their minds without us’. Attlee, having agreed to
this, sent messages to the prime ministers of the three Dominions informing
them of the proposed mission by Dening and urging the utmost secrecy in
dealing with the visit.92
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 In his instructions it was suggested that he should tell the three Dominion
governments that London hoped that the proposed talks with the Americans
would lead to ‘a common policy’ on East Asia. While ‘at the least it might
result in a clarification of policy’ it was also possible that they might open the
way ‘towards the summoning of a Japanese peace conference and ... to
some kind of regional security arrangements’. More specifically on the Japan
question it was acknowledged that Britain and the other Commonwealth
countries had ‘an important stake in the Japanese settlement’ and  that ‘there
would be considerable and justifiable resentment were the U.S. to take
unilateral action in her dealings with Japan’. The British believed that the
United States was mistaken in its wish to delay the peace conference and
that the failure to act would work against the objective of persuading the
Japanese to support the West. From the British point of view the American
security aims could be achieved at the time of the signing of the peace treaty
by the conclusion , either of a bilateral agreement between the United
States and Japan which would give the former the necessary bases in
the Japanese islands, or of some kind of a regional security pact (this
on the assumption that the Soviet Union would not subscribe to the
treaty and would not therefore be in a position to participate in such a
pact).
From the experience of the Canberra Conference it was thought that ‘there
should be no great difficulty in obtaining Commonwealth agreement in a
Peace Treaty which would adequately meet U.S. requirements’.93
Dening arrived in Australia in the first week of May 1948 just as events in
Europe were reaching a critical stage. Following the communist coup in
Czechoslovakia, Britain and America pressed ahead with their plans for
Western union, integrating the economies of their German occupation zones,
supporting anti-Communist political forces in France and Italy and beginning
talks for some form of mutual guarantee against aggression. On the eve of
Dening’s arrival the British High Commissioner had relayed to Chifley and
Evatt a message from Attlee which set out British plans for a ‘Conference of
Atlantic Powers’  under which the American President might provide support
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for countries subject to an armed attack. For Burton this plan coming as it did
on the heels of a series of anti-Soviet measures only served to intensify his
hostility to these Anglo-American initiatives. In his eyes the proposal was
‘preposterous’, especially in its claim that the Western Union was being
formed in accordance with the self-defence Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. He maintained, as he had in Chifley’s reply to Attlee in January when
the British Government had first mooted these ideas, that such a scheme was
based ‘on the assumption that Russia has an aggressive intent’, and that the
Western alliance would ‘bring about just the set of circumstances that the
proposal purports to avoid’. What was contemplated was not containment but
‘encirclement’. In a memorandum to Evatt his anger knew no bounds: ‘the
U.S.-U.K. effrontery goes to the length of suggesting that there are no
dangers in this area and that the only danger to security is in Europe and, by
implication, our fears regarding United States policy in Japan are unjustified’.
It was useless to counter this ‘fatal policy’ with another cable to London. The
British took no notice of Australian objections ‘otherwise they would not have
the effrontery after past replies to communicate a message of this nature to
you and the Prime Minister’. He opined that they ‘obviously hope, by ignoring
responses, the time will come when this or another government will be
persuaded to go along with them’.94 Watching the march of events, Chifley,
however, was already willing ‘to go along with them’ and Evatt found himself
in something of a quandary.
In Canberra Dening encountered the full range of these responses. The
British representatives’ reports of these talks, which took place from 5 - 7 May
illustrate this quite well. On the first morning Dening accompanied by the High
Commissioner had met with Chifley and Evatt. Though Dening was ostensibly
an emissary sent by Attlee to speak to Chifley, Chifley in accepting the British
Prime Minister’s invitation to receive Dening had insisted that he would want
Evatt to be present ‘when we are discussing any matters affecting the
European(sic) position’. In an effort to wean the Australians from their
objections to Western union and to set the scene for the East Asian issues
Dening opened by ‘communicating foreign secretary’s views about the
European situation’. Chifley interrupted at various points and made
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comments which ‘showed considerable insight’ and ‘in general’ he ‘showed
himself to be both sympathetic and understanding as regards our position
and our aims in Europe’. He had ‘no illusions about Soviet aims’. Dening was
comforted by Chifley’s response which ‘broadly speaking...agreed with the
actions we have taken in regard to the Marshall Plan and the Western Union’.
When Dening turned to the question of secret talks with the Americans about
East Asia both Chifley and Evatt had protested that secret talks were not in
keeping with the spirit of the United Nations. But after Dening had explained
that the result of these talks might be ‘a regional security pact in the Pacific’ in
conformity with the United Nations both Chifley and Evatt ‘changed their view
and admitted that they had been trying for the past 2 years to get the United
States to commit  themselves to some kind of regional security arrangement’.
Chifley then ‘agreed to talks on the basis put forward by Dening’, and he
thought them a matter of ‘urgency in view of the indications that the United
States might take unilateral action over Japan’. The following day Dening had
a meeting with Evatt, Burton and other officers of the Department of External
Affairs. After Evatt was called away to attend to his parliamentary duties,
Burton ‘launched into an attack on American policy the world over’. If
anything Burton’s anti-American outlook had hardened since January. He
asserted that ‘there were a number of subjects on which Australia and the
U.S. could never agree’. He blamed the American attitude towards Russia for
‘vitiating the whole world atmosphere and preventing the settlement of any
problems, including the Japanese problem’. Evatt nevertheless approved
Australian participation in the talks in principle; they ‘might do good and could
do no harm’. On the matter of the Japanese peace Dening considered that
there was no ‘wide divergence’ between the British and Australians but that
while the British ‘hope to steer American policy in the right direction by
diplomacy, the present Evatt-Burton inclination would seem to be to
accomplish it by an openly provocative attitude’. He found the departmental
position to be ‘depressing to a degree’ since ‘Appeasement of the Soviet
Union seemed to be their main aim’. Though Chifley in a further interview
reaffirmed Australian willingness to join in secret talks with the Americans,
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Dening was near despair over the Deparmental state of mind. As the Evatt-
Burton attitude to the Americans was ‘common talk in Canberra’ he feared
that Washington must be aware of it and therefore most unlikely to enter into
five power talks when Australia was one of these powers.95 This was the sorry
story which was relayed to London.
Dening’s suspicions were confirmed by his subsequent talks in Washington.
Apart from the fact that the Americans were approaching a presidential
election, the State Departmental officials with whom he exchanged views
were absolutely opposed to entering into talks on East Asia with the
Australian Government. At the opening meeting the Under-Secretary of State,
Robert A. Lovett, ‘expressed particular doubts about Australia’. He asked
Dening whether it was possible to rely on Australian security to which Dening
had merely replied that he hoped so. Lovett was unhappy with Evatt’s public
criticism of American policy and declared that ‘if Australia wanted the United
States to stand as a bulwark between her and possible aggression from the
north, he found these statements hard to reconcile with such a view’. Dening
did his best to present Australia’s attitude in a sympathetic light, Though he
had to admit that, while Chifley’s attitude to the Soviet question was sound,
Evatt and the Department of External Affairs held ‘somewhat unrealistic’
views about ‘Communist designs and methods’. When they broached the
subject of a Japanese peace treaty, Dening agreed with the Americans that
Japan after its total defeat and demilitarisation no longer constituted a threat
to peace in Asia or the Pacific and attributed Australian and New Zealand
apprehensions about the United States new course in lifting the limits on
Japan industrial redevelopment to their not having recovered ‘from the shock
of the war’. At the end he had to accept that the Americans would neither
agree to an early peace treaty - their objections as the British acknowledged
were at bottom ‘strategic’ - nor to five power talks. They would consent to bi-
lateral talks with the British and even admit the Canadians to the ‘inner circle’.
Relations between Australia and America, however, were so ‘bad’ that
Dening ‘saw little prospect of their improving until there is a change of heart
on the part of Dr. Evatt and the Australian External Affairs Department’. At the
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end he judged that the Americans were ‘most unlikely to confide anything of
importance to the Australians until they are satisfied that Australian security is
what it should be’.96
Even before he learnt of the American reaction the British Foreign Secretary
had been greatly disconcerted by the reports from Australia. At a meeting
with Attlee and Philip Noel-Baker, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations, Bevin told his colleagues of Dening’s mixed reception in Canberra.
Because of the Australian and to a lesser extent the New Zealand
governments’ failure to understand British policies in Europe and Asia he had
sent Dening to explain to them on the spot the rationale for Britain’s advocacy
of Western union and to persuade them to join in talks with the Americans on
East Asia. While Chifley’s response had been satisfactory, in Evatt and
Burton Dening had ‘come up against a brick wall’. The tensions with the
Soviet Union were reaching a critical point and the formation of an Atlantic
Pact ‘would be a greater guarantee for security than any European union
without America support’. It was ‘vital to have Commonwealth understanding
and support of our policy’. In particular, aiming his remarks at the Australians,
he thought it important to persuade the Commonwealth countries ‘to back the
United Kingdom Government and understand that  such a regional pact was
in accord with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’. Bevin seemed to
regret that it had come about that Britain’s relations with the United States
were closer than those with members of the Commonwealth. He therefore
urged that a Consultative Council should be formed ‘to co-ordinate the affairs
of the Commonwealth’. It would parallel that set up ‘to keep close contact
between the countries of the Western Union’ and would have ‘its economic
and political sides’.
Appreciating the reasons for Australian recalcitrance Bevin said that Britain
should insist on a peace treaty with Japan. He recognised that the Australian
Government were ‘suspicious of General MacArthur’s policy in Japan and
naturally did not wish to see that country made as sturdy and as truculent as
61
it was before this last war in order to serve as a bulwark for the Americans
against Soviet Russia’. On the other hand if Russia refused to take its place
at the peace table ‘it would be so much to the good’. Presumably he
expected that a Japanese peace made by the Western powers alone would
help to consolidate the position of the West in East Asia. Summing up the
grave problem which postwar events had posed for the Commonwealth,
Bevin declared that ‘if the Commonwealth was to serve as an independent
and a strong unit amongst the world’s chief Powers’ then it would need to be
given ‘energetic treatment’. Attlee and Noel-Baker agreed that Bevin’s idea
for a ‘Consultative Council’ should be pursued and it was suggested that a
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference should be held as soon as
possible for the purpose of achieving this objective. And ten days later Attlee
invited all the Commonwealth prime ministers to an early conference. There
were, he wrote, three questions ‘of the greatest importance’ on which ‘full
consultation is essential’ and urgently required, namely developments in
Germany, an early Japanese peace conference and the implications of
Western Union, and these were the questions, it should be noted, that were
the most contentious in the Anglo-Australian dispute about the postwar
world.97
In their weakened state the British clung to the dream of a united Empire as
expressed in both World Wars in order to bolster their claim to be a world
power. Yet not only had the  Commonwealth’s character been altered
significantly by the admission of the Asian members who unlike the ‘old
Dominions’ did not share the British heritage and harboured colonial
resentments but also by the divisive issues of strategy and sovereignty which
had troubled the ‘old Dominions’ in the interwar years and which now
returned in an even more acute form. As the British were to discover the
Commonwealth could never play its World War role again. Britain had to
reconcile itself to the fact that ties both with the United States, ties which
bound them in a subordinate manner, and to a lesser extent with its Western
European allies were more intimate and vital than those with the
Commonwealth. Though Australia with New Zealand had been the most
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‘loyal’ Dominions and had only reluctantly acceded to the fissiparous reforms
to Commonwealth relations which Canada, South Africa and the Irish Free
State had initiated in the 1920s and 1930s, it nevertheless found the gap
between its own and Britain’s strategic priorities to be so great that it had
difficulty in finding common ground with Britain about the Cold War and its
meaning for  Europe. The long-held desire to share a common defence and
foreign policy with the Mother country, to construct a unified front, a British
race front, in dealing with the world, crumbled before these inexorable forces.
Both Britain and Australia had trouble in acknowledging  that the postwar
forces pushing them apart  were not short term considerations but the
culmination of longterm trends which were transforming the Commonwealth.
Indeed the potency of the British race idea was such - indeed more so in
Australia than Britain - that it was to take a further generation before the two
nations could cease to define their role in the world in these terms and begin
to contemplate new ways of understanding themselves and their futures.98
Australia was one of a minority of the Commonwealth countries which
accepted Attlee’s invitation to an early conference. Even then Chifley made it
clear that he could only come for a brief time in early July  and that he only
wanted to discuss economic issues; if foreign affairs issues were to be on the
agenda then they might be left to Evatt who would visit London after he had
returned to Australia.99 The British might surmise that Chifley and Evatt held
different views of the world and Australia’s role in the world but plainly Chifley
did not. This rather indifferent response to Attlee’s urgent appeal was a
symptom of the problem which lay at the heart of the emerging
Commonwealth. The other members of the Commonwealth - New Zealand
might be seen as an exception - no longer accepted Britain’s leadership in
world affairs, they did not see their differences over the Soviet intentions in
Europe as creating a Commonwealth crisis and they were not willing at such
short notice to set aside pressing domestic political commitments in order to
go to London to exchange views.100
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The British nevertheless were pleased that Chifley was willing to come and
they prepared well for his visit. He was invited to attend a British Cabinet
meeting, a symbol of the old intimacy which was not extended to the
Americans or the new Asian members of the Commonwealth. While the
British constructed a program which was in accord with his wishes to
concentrate on economic affairs, they also made opportunities for brief
discussions of security, defence and foreign policy matters, including in the
latter the American attitude towards the Japanese peace treaty. Meeting with
Chifley on this question Bevin repeated Dening’s message that Britain
wanted an early Japanese peace treaty and desired to engage in talks with
the Americans to this end. The United States because of their suspicions of
Soviet aims were reluctant to consider an early treaty and seemed bent on
building up the Japanese economy. It was also encouraging the Western
European nations who were benefitting from the Marshall Plan to extend the
most-favoured-nation trade principle to Japan. The British wondered whether
the American unwillingness to consider an early peace might stir resentment
in Japan and they considered that the whole question of the revision of the
limits to be placed on Japanese industry should be a matter for discussion in
the FEC. Chifley’s response was vague; while he ‘appreciated the United
States desire to preserve Japan from falling into the Communist orbit’ he felt
it was ‘more rather than less likely’ to happen if the economic restraints on
Japan were not to some degree lifted so it could ‘provide her people with a
reasonable standard of living’. He approved the British idea that they should
enter into talks with the Americans as soon as possible.101
The British, despite the European tensions which by this time had erupted
into the confrontation over Berlin, nevertheless were still much exercised by
the problem of Japan and America’s seeming determination to take unto itself
the sole responsibility for deciding policy. The Dening visit to Washington had
not been reassuring. As a result after Chifley’s return home the British sent all
Commonwealth governments their analysis of America’s proposals to lift the
limits on Japan’s industrial development in order to make its economy self-
supporting by 1953. The British pointed out that the envisaged expansion of
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steel and shipbuilding would conflict with previous standards set for ensuring
security. Looking for a common policy in dealing with the Americans they
asked the Commonwealth Governments for their views both on the issue of
limits and also on how best to approach the Americans, that is whether to
press the established security requirements and risk the Americans ignoring
the Commonwealth or to try to persuade the Americans that they could
achieve their ends with lower levels of economic development. To the three
‘old Dominions’ they sent additionally an appraisal of the political and
strategic considerations underpinning the Americans’ ‘new course’. As
Dening had explained to the prime ministers, the United States policy, that is
its opposition to a peace treaty and its support for building up Japan’s
economy, was governed by fear of the Soviet Union. Though the British
Government advised by their Chiefs of Staff believed that there was
justification for America’s concerns about the Soviet Union they did not agree
with the American answer to the problem. It was ’of great importance’ that the
Americans should be persuaded to agree to an early peace treaty
accompanied by a Japanese-American defence treaty which would
guarantee security and to accept somewhat lower levels for industrial
rehabilitation than the ‘unnecessary and dangerous’ levels which the
American missions to Japan had recommended.
The Australians, responding to this political assessment, reasserted Evatt’s
view that the Americans were ‘obsessed’ about the Soviet Union ‘to the
exclusion of other considerations’  and that as a result of their plans for
rebuilding Japan they were likely ‘in the long run to defeat their own ends’.
They would be not only ‘unnecessarily provoking  Soviet Russia’ but also
restoring Japan to ‘a position of power and assertiveness’ which would lead
that country to throw off American influence and so make it ‘dangerous to all
of us’. In essence, though they indicated some reservations about the
efficacy of ‘persuasion’, the Australians agreed with the British that it would
be desirable for the Americans to enter into an early peace settlement which
was accompanied by a bilateral treaty which would give the Americans base
rights in Japan. This offered ‘the best assurance of security in the Pacific’.
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And the Australians also agreed with the British that if the Americans adopted
this course then they might well be willing to fix Japan’s economic
development at levels which would make Japan ‘self-sufficient but not
dangerous’.102 From this it would appear that Australia and Britain were of one
mind in their attitude to America’s plans for the future of Japan, that Japan
instead of drawing them apart was in fact bringing them together.
Having been forced to give up the idea of holding an urgent Commonwealth
prime ministers’ meeting in late June the British then began to make plans for
a meeting in October which would accomplish the same ends. Whitehall
prepared elaborately for the occasion. The agenda was to cover international
relations, especially the problem of the Soviet Union, the prospect of
Commonwealth political and defence co-operation with Western Europe and
the United States, the ‘Japanese problem in the Pacific’, the development of
the economic resources of the Commonwealth and machinery for improving
Commonwealth consultation. Driven by Britain’s role at the centre of the
gathering world crisis, the agenda was more ambitious than that of any
preceding Prime Ministers’ Conference. The Foreign Office’s concerns about
Australia’s and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand’s failure to appreciate fully
Britain’s view of the world situation and the Soviet threat to Western Europe
were shared by the Defence Department.  As with foreign policy so with
defence there was closer co-operation with the United States than with the
Commonwealth countries. This seemed unnatural. In a paper approved by
the Chiefs of Staff which set out  the problem it was noted that
‘No joint meetings take place. No joint military plans have been created.
No plans of co-ordinated or complementary development of
Commonwealth Armed Forces has been evolved. No Plan has been
agreed on “who should do what and when” in an emergency’.
And the paper continued
Military co-operation with America, with whom no treaty exists nor
certainty that she will enter any war with us from the start, is almost
complete. Under the present world circumstances, economic and
defence factors have led to the creation of the Western Union, out of
which has come the Western Union Military Committee detailed to
organise Western Union defence. We are thus allied with a number of  
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foreign powers whose military and moral values will have to be fortified
immenley (sic) before we draw practical advantages; whereas with the
Dominions-thriving, solvent, and virile countries allied to us by kinship
and Crown-no agreement or body exists to even co-ordinate  
Commonwealth activities including defence. 103
Clearly the Chiefs of Staff were thinking only of the ‘old Dominions’ and the
role they had played in World War I and II. They seemed unaware of the
great gulf in geo-political interests which separated Australia and New
Zealand from Britain, a gulf which the Commonwealth from its own resources
could not bridge in World War II and as had been discovered in World War II
could only be dealt with satisfactorily through American co-operation.
Sir Norman Brook, the Secretary to the Cabinet, in endorsing  the Chiefs of
Staff’s views, summarised the substance of their complaint for a meeting of
the relevant British ministers on 28 July. Since the end of the war ‘no
progress has been made towards the effective co-ordination of
Commonwealth defence policy’. On defence matters he repeated what had
already been said for foreign policy, namely that  there was ‘closer co-
operation today between the United Kingdom and the United States than
there is between the United Kingdom and the other self-governing parts of
the Commonwealth’. The problem was that, unlike the relationship with
America, there had been ‘no continuity of political discussion about the aims
and objectives of defence policy’. There had not been any ‘politico-military
discussions’ with the Commonwealth countries similar to those which had
been held with the Americans in Washington the previous October. The
answer in the minds of the officials from all departments was that what was
required was better machinery for consulting with the Commonwealth
governments. They should be informed not simply about those questions of
defence and foreign policy which directly affected them but more generally
about the great global issues into which their own particular concerns had to
fit. It was suggested that there should be more frequent prime ministers’
meetings- at intervals of no more than three years- and that in between there
should be meetings of ‘Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers and Finance
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Ministers’ and the meetings of these latter ministers need not be inclusive but
where occasion warranted be based on geographical or other criteria. The
meetings might be held in capital cities other than London. How it was
expected that this would bring the Dominions’ relationship to be on a par with
that of the United States is unclear. Brook accepted, as he had to, that these
meetings were simply for exchange of views and did not look towards framing
a common policy which would bind the members of the Commonwealth. Why
should more information or discussion be likely to produce the almost
identical world view which the British and the Americans shared? Since
Canada was a member of the Atlantic Consultative Council and the newly
independent Asian members could not be expected to see eye to eye with
those who were kith and kin this British problem about the lack of co-
operation and co-ordination  was directed at Australia and New Zealand, and
primarily Australia. It was not strictly true that there had been no politico-
military discussions with Australia. Evatt and Chifley had attended the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in 1946. The Chief of the
Imperial General Staff had met with the Australian Cabinet and its defence
advisers in 1947. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and
officials of the Foreign Office had visited Canberra for the Conference on the
Japan peace settlement. Dening had had extensive talks about  Europe and
East Asia with Chifley and the Department of the External Affairs. At bottom
the issue was not one of knowledge and understanding but of different geo-
political preoccupations. Nothing that Brook had recommended was likely to
be able to overcome this conflict of national interests. Nevertheless the British
ministers agreed that Brook’s recommendations should be placed before the
Commonwealth Conference.104
When the Conference met the British ministers in introducing the topics made
great efforts to convince the assembled prime ministers of the need to take
action to protect Western Europe and the Middle East from Soviet aggression
and subversion. The tense stand-off over Berlin provided a grave backdrop
for the discussion. Bevin gave an account of the Soviet actions since the end
of World War II which had led to the failure of collective security under the
United Nations, the overthrow of elected governments in Eastern Europe and
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the impasse in dealing with a German peace. He explained that British policy
was ‘to promote the security and stability of Western Europe’  by creating ‘a
material force’ in conjunction with the United States and Canada which could
‘halt ...further communist infiltration and totalitarian aggression’. Bringing all
the threads together at the end of the Conference Attlee and the Defence
Minister, A.V.Alexander, commended to the assembled leaders a special
briefing paper on ‘The World Situation and its Defence Aspects’ which
encapsulated the British Government’s ideas on how the Commonwealth
should fit into its global strategy. This session was the high point of the
Conference in that it was intended  to associate the Commonwealth with
Britain in its worldwide partnership with the United States in the struggle to
contain the Soviet Union. The paper with its appendix by the Chiefs of Staff
on ‘Commonwealth Defence Co-operation’ was a blueprint pointing the way
to this end. It stated, following on from Bevin’s earlier account of British
foreign policy, that ‘the Soviet policy and aims are a threat to all free nations,
who are in danger of being subjugated one by one’. The Soviet Union was
conducting aggressive activities on a global scale.
‘The Soviet Union and its satellites now form a solid political and
economic bloc extending from the Mediterranean to the Pacific. From
behind these secure entrenchments the Soviet Government are exerting
constantly increasing pressure which threatens the whole fabric of
civilisation, religious, political, cultural and material, as we know it. In
some countries the danger is still latent , but in France, Trieste, Italy,
Greece, Burma, Malaya and China the conflictng forces are at grips with
one another’.
To meet this international emergency the British Government had sought to
join with the United States, the Western European and  Commonwealth
countries for the purpose of ‘organising all possible deterrent forces’. The
British Government had reached a political understanding on these questions
with the United States and the Western European countries and as a result
they were engaged in military planning with these countries for the common
protection. They thought it desirable that ‘corresponding planning should take
place within the Commonwealth’. For this purpose it was necessary that
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If... an adequate defence system is to be built up , which will enable the
countries of the Commonwealth to live in security and exercise their
rightful influence in world affairs and will lessen their dependence on
any outside source, an essential preliminary will be the requisite degree
of political agreement between the respective Commonwealth
Governments on basic objectives of policy.
For the British the central task of this  conference was to convince the leaders
of the Commonwealth that they should reach such an agreement so that the
defence planning could proceed. Attlee in opening the discussion on this
topic showed some sensitivity to the diverse regional interests of the member
nations. He recognised that ‘defence co-operation must in the first instance
be on a regional basis’ since ‘Commonwealth countries had their special
interest in their own areas, and it was logical that they should be primarily
concerned with those interests’. But the way that ‘the interests of the different
areas interacted had been brought out in earlier discussions and there was
need to ensure co-ordination between the defence policies of the different
regions’. The British Government was anxious to extend to the
Commonwealth the same system of co-operation in defence which they had
already established with the United States and Western Europe. This, he
assured the Conference, would ‘not mean subordination, but a free
partnership for mutual help’.
The Commonwealth Prime Ministers were, even if in different ways, agreed
that the world was confronted by a Communist menace. There was, however,
a great difference in their responses to the British appeal for common
defence planning. All had some form of reservation about what was
proposed. Despite the Chiefs of Staff‘s doubts about whether the newly
independent South Asian members should be invited to these defence talks,
Attlee had insisted that they share equally in all sessions. Pandit Nehru for
India while accepting that there was a Communist menace saw no urgency in
organising common defence since it appeared that Russia would not be
prepared for war for at least eight to ten years. In the meantime the
Commonwealth should bend all its efforts to preventing that eventuality. India
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would protect its region from external aggression and to that extent was
willing to co-operate with other Commonwealth members. He evinced no
interest in taking part in a wider defence of the Commonwealth. Pakistan’s
Prime Minister on the other hand declared that  he accepted completely the
British Government’s assessment of the Communist menace and if all other
Commonwealth Governments were of one mind he would be willing to join in
talks aimed at the security of ‘the Commonwealth as a whole’.  Of the ‘old
Dominions’ South Africa and Canada made it clear that they were only
interested in their respective African and Atlantic regions. The Canadian
Prime Minister did not think that agreement on defence policy and general
strategy by all the Commonwealth Governments was a necessary
prerequisite for regional planning. He rejected any suggestion that Canada’s
consultations over the defence of the North Atlantic region should be
interrupted in order to undertake ‘a general study of Commonwealth defence
problems’. He was quite content that the exchange of views and information
should be carried on through the existing channels. Even the New Zealand
Prime Minister who came closest to endorsing the British vision of a common
co-ordinated defence scheme for the Commonwealth could not help asking
whether it might not be possible for ‘the Commonwealth and the United
States together to declare their intention of defending world peace against
aggressors’. That is, if the Pacific Dominions could receive an American
assurance against aggression in their region they would feel freer to
contribute to a mutually supportive Commonwealth scheme.105
Australia, like all the other Commonwealth countries, accepted that the Soviet
Union‘s actions represented a threat to world peace. Evatt who was standing
in for Chifley at the Commonwealth Conference had become much clearer
about the Soviet Union’s responsibility for world tensions. During Chifley‘s
visit to Britain both Bevin and Attlee had complained about Evatt, and Chifley
reported to Attlee that before Evatt had left for overseas he had spoken to
him and asked him to be ‘as helpful as possible’. Whether this was the
reason for Evatt’s rather more co-operative attitude it is difficult to say. It may
well be that domestic and foreign developments were more important. In
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Australia the Chifley Government was having to contend with increasing
industrial militancy from communist-led unions which threatened the
economic well-being of the country.  Moreover Evatt arrived in London in the
midst of the Berlin crisis and he was very troubled by the eruption of
Communist insurgency movements in Malaya and Indonesia. Thus not only
did he support Australia sending arms and troops to help the British put down
the Communists in Malaya but he also expressed a general sympathy for the
British resistance to the Soviet Union’s aggressive stance in Europe. In
talking to officials of the Foreign Office before the Conference he did not offer
any criticism of American policy, expressed understanding of the need ‘for
integration between Western Union countries, especially on economic and
strategic lines’ and ‘appeared to think that a drawing together of the
Commonwealth and the United States accompanied by a measure of
progress along the lines of the Western Union was the right formula’.106
During the Prime Ministers Conference Evatt in responding to Bevin’s tour
d’horizons  expressed sympathy with all that the British and Americans had
done to resist Soviet pressures. He said that ‘Soviet expansion could not be
permitted to continue’. He seemed to argue that the present difficulties which
had so weakened the United Nations and produced the East-West divisions
derived from the veto in the Security Council and the claims of the Great
Powers to determine the peace, and in this ‘the United States Government
had shared its responsibility with the Soviet Union’. But then he proceeded to
praise the formation of the Western Union under Section 51 of the United
Nations Charter and to praise the Americans for taking a firm attitude to the
Soviet Union which had finally called a halt to its ‘expansionist activities’ at
Berlin. Australian airmen were taking part in the airlift, ‘and this in itself
indicated what would be Australia’s attitude if the crisis should further
deteriorate’. He, however, appeared not to accept the ideological determinism
of Bevin and still held out hope for a change in Soviet policy, but the Western
powers would have to be assured that any agreement entered into with the
Russians would be kept.
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At the meeting dealing with defence co-operation he was equally affirmative.
Attlee had cabled a copy of the briefing paper to Chifley and he had sent
Evatt some initial reactions to the document. He told Evatt that the Western
Union plan which united the Western European countries with the United
States in a regional defence plan was ‘in principle in accordance with the
Australian Government’s views with regard to the Pacific region’, suggesting
by this language that it was exactly what Australia itself desired for its region.
Likewise he concluded that
Insofar as Australia is concerned , the development of corresponding
British Commonwealth planning to that proposed between United
Kingdom, United States and Western European countries, would also
require the linking of Australian and British Commonwealth plans with
those of the United States in the Pacific, to cope with the Soviet threat in
the Pacific.107
Thus Evatt declared at the meeting that the Australian Government was ‘in
general agreement’ with the views and proposals contained in the briefing
paper. He ‘did not dissent from the view that in military planning the
assumption must be that the enemy would be the Soviet Union’. The
‘democratic Powers‘ had a responsibility to ‘maintain a firm and united front
against further Soviet pressure’. It followed that prudence required the
Commonwealth to ensure its defence was in an ‘adequate state of
preparation’. In Australia’s view ‘it was not sufficient for Commonwealth
Governments to consider defence problems on a regional basis’. It was
certain that ‘If war came it would not be a regional war; and consultation on
defence matters should take place on the Commonwealth as well as a
regional basis’. 108
At the Commonwealth Conference Japan appeared only as a very minor
issue. Bevin in dealing with Japan had pointed out that the United States was
no longer considering Japan as a potential enemy but rather as a potential
ally against Russia and as a consequence was inclined to abandon all
controls over Japanese industry and to press for the extension of the most-
73
favoured-nation principle. He had urged that in the light of these
developments the Commonwealth should ‘take counsel together’ on what
should be done. Evatt, taking his cue from Bevin’s lead,  aired once again his
grievance that the movement towards making peace, of which the Canberra
Conference had been a part, had been frustrated by the growth of Soviet-
American hostility. From the Pacific Dominions’ perspective the American
tendency to treat Japan as a possible ally in a future war with the Soviet
Union had to be approached with ‘special caution’. Such a step called for ‘a
nice judgment of Japan’s future policy’, and Evatt had doubts about Japan’s
change of heart.  Australia while it did not have a rigid view about the level of
Japan’s industrial development nevertheless remained convinced that Japan
‘must not be allowed to establish a dangerous war potential’. The Americans
seemed to believe that they could alone determine Japan’s future and Evatt
urged that the Commonwealth should resist such an assumption. But the
other members of the conference expressed little or no interest in the
matter.109
This was the last Prime Ministers’ conference to evince to any degree a
sense of common purpose. Never again would a conference meet with even
an expectation that they might be able to achieve a common outlook on
global strategy. Even though all the Commonwealth leaders had expressed
general agreement with Britain’s view of the the world crisis and a few had
seemed to allow that the idea of defence planning for mutual help had some
merit hardly anything was done to give effect to this British conception of a
co-operative Commonwealth working side by side with the Western Union
and the United States. Equally the plans for improved machinery for
consultation insofar as they were implememented did nothing to overcome
the geo-political and geo-cultural differences which stood in the way of
Commonwealth unity. In the immediate aftermath of the conference the
British Government pressed on the Australians and New Zealanders, as the
most enthusiastic supporters of Commonwealth defence co-operation, the
need to proceed quickly with regional and global planning. While the
Australian Government evinced some interest in pursuing regional planning
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they were most reluctant to contemplate anything beyond this without, as
Chifley informed Attlee, ‘something more concrete than the statement of the
United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff...that “we consider that the threat in the
Pacific can be adequately matched by American naval and air strength”’.110
The Australians, as they had made clear in devising their plans for  postwar
defence against Japan, saw that in the final analysis  their security in the
Pacific depended on American guarantees. Lacking American assurances,
they were not willing to participate in Commonwealth planning for mutual
military support and assistance-which the British understood to mean the
deployment of Australian forces for the defence of the Middle East.
Likewise Commonwealth or more specifically Anglo-Australian co-operation in
working towards a Japanese peace treaty was impeded by the Americans.
The Canberra  Conference meant nothing in the face of American obduracy.
Though the British and the Australians might have disliked American high-
handedness and shared to a large degree--the British were not as
preoccupied with Pacific security—common aims for the peace, nevertheless
they could do nothing until the Americans decided the time was ripe to
proceed. Japan had been sucked into the whirlpool of the Cold War and
since the United States had military control of Japan and was the superpower
in the Western alliance Japan’s future lay in its hands. During 1949 and 1950
the British consulted with the Australians and other members of the
Commonwealth about the terms for a peace treaty. But these discussions
lacked direction and conviction. Australia, both under the Labor Government
and its successor Coalition Government, reiterated its fears of Japan and
complained of American indifference to its concerns. The Australian
representative at the Commonwealth Working Party on the Japanese Peace
Treaty  in May 1950 declared
Japan must be left with no loophole for the resurgence of militarism.
Thus though ...Japan must have a self-supporting economy, it was also
necessary to insist that her capacity for making and supporting war was
not reerected.
The problem of the Japanese Peace treaty had to be considered
against the background of world affairs and the attitude of the United
75
States of America must of necessity be of significance....[American]
policy towards Japan was becoming more and more unilateral and...
Japan was sliding into a state of peace without the Commonwealth
Governments having any say in the matter.
Australia wanted to see Japan as a member of the comity of Free
Nations- but before this could happen Japan must show that she could
and would adhere to democratic ways. The security  of Australia must
be the starting point of the Australian Delegation’s approach to this
problem.
Australia regarded the possibility of Russian expansion as a grave
danger ; ...equally Australia saw a grave danger in the revival of
Japanese military power.111
But the Commonwealth even if it could act as one had no way of influencing
the peace with Japan to achieve Australian objectives. The Australians had
no choice but to bide their time. And when at last the Americans did decide to
begin the process of peacemaking, the Australians acted alone, or more
accurately with New Zealand, to seek an American security alliance in return
for accepting a ‘soft’ Japanese peace.The Menzies Coalition Government
had obtained what Chifley and Evatt had long sought not because they were
superior diplomats but because the Americans after the outbreak of the
Korean War had embraced a policy of worldwide containment of Communism
through the creation of alliances along the East Asian archipelagoes from
Japan in the north to Australia and New Zealand in the south. For all
Australian leaders this was the best and safest solution to the general
problem of security in the Pacific, including the problem of Japan.112 Though
Britain in its depleted state at the end of World War II had attempted to give a
new lease of life to the Commonwealth in the Pacific by acceding to
Australian claims to be recognised as having the ‘prime risks and
responsibilities’ in the region, most notably on the question of Japan, and
therefore the right to leadership of the Commonwealth in their own domain,
nevertheless despite the continuing strength of cultural identity with the
‘Mother country’ the Australians were not satisfied with this gesture - and
indeed the British themselves were not too pleased with the result.
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The problem of Australian security in the Pacific highlighted by the
appearance of Japan’s armed might on the very coasts of the country in
World War II  could no longer have a Commonwealth solution - if ever that
had in practice been feasible. Indeed the Anzus Pact was a fitting Australian
answer to Nato. Britain and Canada had joined with the United States to
protect British regional interests in Europe: Australia and New Zealand did
not belong. Under the Anzus Pact Australia and New Zealand joined with the
United States for the purpose of defending their regional interests and Britain,
much to its chagrin, was excluded. Britain still purported to be the centre of
the Commonwealth and to be a global power encompassing East Asia and
the Pacific as well as Europe and the Middle East. But this was a fiction and
the Australians and New Zealanders were forced, despite themselves, to
recognise it as such. The period 1945-1948 was a period of great turmoil in
Commonwealth relations. New experiments were tried in many directions,
including the Pacific. Britain tried to rally the organisation through co-
ordination and co-operation to meet the Soviet challenge in Europe and the
Middle East, but the diversity of interests of the member nations, even of
Australia and New Zealand which remained proudly British in their sense of
cultural identity, was such that this grand vision of Britain as a world power
leading the Commonwealth in association with the United States and
Western Europe was quickly shown to be an illusion.
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